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Article
COLLATERAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES IN MARYLAND:
AN ASSESSMENT
MICHAEL

I.

A.

MILLEMANN*

INTRODUCTION

In this Article, I describe and evaluate the major collateral remedies in Maryland that are available to prisoners to challenge unlawful
convictions and sentences: the writ of habeas corpus,' a motion to
correct an illegal sentence,2 and a postconviction proceeding.3 By
"collateral," I mean the process that begins upon completion of direct
review.4 The state's Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (PCPA)
provides the primary remedy.5 Additional remedies include proceed7
6
ings based on newly discovered evidence and on DNA evidence,
and, for persons who are not in or under custody, the writ of error
coram nobis.s
The collateral process is a vital part of our criminal justice system.
When important facts exist outside the trial record, the collateral pro* Jacob A. France Professor of Public Interest Law, University of Maryland School of
Law. I would like to thank Phil Pierson for his research and editorial assistance, and Ted
Tomlinson and Richard Boldt for their very helpful editorial comments.
1. See infra Part III.A.
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. See infta Part III.C.
4. See generally I DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
§ 1-5, at 18 (2001). Wilkes refers to this process as the "postconviction" process. I use the
word "collateral" to avoid confusion. In Maryland, there is a "postconviction" process, but
it is but one of several collateral remedies. Wilkes notes that recently "there have been
some inroads on the principle that postconviction proceedings are to be postponed until
after the direct review proceedings are completed or unavailable." Id. Wilkes cites Texas
as an example, where, in death penalty cases, postconviction habeas corpus cases "run
concurrently" with direct appeals. Id.; see 2 WILKEs, supra, app. A at 640 (citing James C.
Harrington & Anne More Burnham, Texas's New Habeas Corpus Procedurefor Death-Row Inmates: KaJkaesque--andProbably Unconstitutional,27 ST. MARY'S L.J.69, 89-90 (1995)). Texas
law requires any application for a writ of habeas corpus to be filed within 180 days of the
appointment of counsel by the convicting court or within 45 days of the date the state's
brief is filed with the court of criminal appeals. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
11.071(4) (a) (Vernon 2005).
5. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -301 (2004). See generally Edward A. Tomlinson, Post-Conviction in Maryland: Past, Present and Future, 45 MD. L. REv. 927, 934 (1986).
6. See infra Part IV.C.2.a.
7. See infta Part IV.C.2.a.
8. See infta note 85.
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cess is usually the sole means by which a convicted person can enforce
fundamental fair-trial rights, for example, to the effective assistance of

counsel,9 to obtain exculpatory evidence, 1 ° and to ajury trial (absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver). 1
I begin, however, by describing the substantial federal disengagement in this area, which enhances the importance of the state's collateral remedies. The retrenchment in federal habeas corpus in the last
fifteen years has been extraordinary.1 2 At the direction of Congress
and the United States Supreme Court, the federal judiciary now plays
an extremely limited role in protecting the federal constitutional
rights of state prisoners.1" Today, it is the state's courts to which a
person who is wrongfully convicted in Maryland must primarily look
for relief, not only as a first resort, but often effectively as the last
resort. It is good, therefore, that Maryland's system of collateral remedies is strong and comprehensive in many respects.
The General Assembly has rejected proposals to import restrictive
provisions of federal law into the state's postconviction statute,1 4 per9. Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 434-35, 439 A.2d 542, 559 (1982). But see In re Parris
W., 363 Md. 717, 726, 770 A.2d 202, 207 (2001) (noting that although the "general rule
[is] that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised most appropriately in a postconviction proceeding... [, this rule) is not absolute and, where the critical facts are not
in dispute and the record is sufficiently developed to permit a fair evaluation of the claim,
there is no need for a collateral fact-finding proceeding, and review on direct appeal may
be appropriate and desirable" (citing Harris v. State, 299 Md. 511, 517, 474 A.2d 890, 893
(1984))).
10. Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 595, 790 A.2d 15, 29 (2002) (holding that a postconviction hearing is the appropriate venue to challenge a violation of a defendant's right to
obtain exculpatory evidence if he had no way of knowing about the evidence sooner);
accord Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 768 A.2d 675 (2001).
11. Smith v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 13 Md. App. 53, 280 A.2d 910 (1971) (granting,
in a postconviction proceeding, an applicant's challenge to the waiver of right to a trial by
jury).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. The most dramatic action of Congress was its enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the United States Code). See generally 2 RANDY HERTZ &
JAMES S. LIEBMAN,FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. a (4th ed. 2001)
(providing a detailed account of AEDPA amendments of Title 28 of the United States
Code). Before 1996, however, the Supreme Court had restricted the use of federal habeas
corpus in a series of decisions. See infra Part II.B.
14. For example, see Act of May 24, 1991, ch. 499, 1991 Md. Laws 2992, 2992-99, in
which the General Assembly rejected proposed amendments to Article 27, § 645A. These
amendments, inter alia, would have:
(1) Barred, with narrow exceptions, any retroactive application of new rules in postconviction proceedings. Id. at 2997 (This is the federal habeas rule initially established in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).)
(2) Reversed the current waiver rule for claims based on "fundamental" rights with the
easier-to-satisfy federal habeas waiver rule. 1991 Md. Laws at 2996-97; see also Coleman v.
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haps in recognition that the federal retrenchment calls for exactly the
opposite: an invigorated state check on the federal process.1 5
Maryland's judiciary has maintained a balance among the various
collateral remedies and used them especially to enforce the right to
the effective assistance of counsel (the predicate to a fair trial),1 6 and
a group of rights deemed "fundamental" for purposes of the PCPA."7
Maryland's current Governor has reestablished the time-honored
policy of considering for parole and clemency prisoners who have
been sentenced to life with parole, at least in a limited way.1" This is
an important part of the state's criminal justice system.
I believe there is a problem, however, that Maryland's appellate
courts can address within the framework of the existing PCPA. It is
the overuse of the "waiver" doctrine in circumstances in which the
policies that support the doctrine do not apply. Maryland's courts,
like most others, rarely resolve postconviction claims on the merits,
usually finding that the petitioner's lawyer waived the claim by failing
to preserve the error at trial, on appeal, or in an initial postconviction
proceeding. What I find extremely troubling is that the substantial
majority of these attorney "waivers" are inadvertent; most are the
product of negligence, but not the gross negligence which, when coupled with prejudice, qualifies as actionable "ineffective assistance of
counsel."'" They do not reflect conscious strategic judgments or, for
that fact, any judgment at all. In these many cases, we accept attorney
negligence as a basis to sustain convictions, lengthy incarceration, and
even state-imposed executions.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (requiring a petitioner to show "cause for the default
and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation [of law that the petitioner wishes to
assert]"). The current rule is that the claim is not waived unless the petitioner personally
and "intelligently and knowingly" fails to assert the claim and could have asserted the
claim, in an earlier proceeding. See infra Part III.C.l.h.
(3) Created a 3-year statute of limitations for noncapital postconviction claims and a
180-day period for capital claims. 1991 Md. Laws at 2995; see also infra Part III.C.l.d.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See infra note 234.
17. See infra Part III.C.1.h(1) (waiver limited to fundamental rights).
18. See Lomax v. Warden, 356 Md. 569, 573, 741 A.2d 476, 478 (1999) (describing the
decision of former Governor Paris Glendening to generally stop considering for parole
prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment). Governor Robert Ehrlich has reinstated the
traditional policy of Maryland Governors to use the commutation, clemency, and paroleapproval powers to mitigate punishment where warranted. As of March 1, 2005, he had
granted commutations to, or approved parole for, four life-sentenced prisoners and three
prisoners sentenced to twenty-five years without parole. This information was provided to
the author by Chrysovalantis Kefalas, Deputy Counsel to Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
19. See infra note 234.
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Clearly, the waiver rules are supported by state interests in finality
and judicial economy, and sometimes by fairness to victims and their
families. However, the reflexive invocation of these rules when they
do not serve the underlying policies gives our criminal justice system
the quality of a lottery by too often basing the ultimate determination
of who goes free and who goes to prison not on defendants' relative
culpability, but rather on the quality of their lawyers.
Although revisions in the waiver rules cannot wholly resolve this
structural problem, they can address it in important ways. There is a
now-dormant provision of the PCPA that excuses waiver when the pe20
titioner can demonstrate that "special circumstances" justify excuse.
I argue that Maryland's courts ought to use this provision, as the General Assembly intended, to excuse waivers. I offer two limited examples: (1) when the failure to make an argument was due to a
reasonably unforeseeable interpretation of law,2 ' and (2) in extraordinary cases, when the petitioner makes an adequate showing of factual
innocence. 2 2 I do not mean, however, to suggest that these are the

only potential uses of the "special circumstances" exception. Rather,
the test is an equitable, context-specific one that should be satisfied
when the policies underlying waiver do not apply.
I address two other issues under the PCPA: (1) whether it entitles
litigants to conduct discovery (although this is a novel issue, I believe
the PCPA authorizes courts, in their discretion, to order limited discovery, including depositions) ;23 and (2) the meaning of the "interests
of justice" standard that governs a court's decision whether to reopen
a postconviction proceeding (its text, legislative history, and the chief
decision interpreting it give it a broad, open-ended meaning).24
The judicial role in collateral cases is a difficult one. Many cases
involve successive petitions, and in most of these cases, the petitioners
proceed pro se. It is sometimes impossible to understand arguments

and to determine whether the petitioner has previously presented
them to a court. If there are appendices, they are often unorganized
and unintelligible. In cases in which the convictions are old-sometimes two or three decades old-the basic records may be unavaila26
ble. 25 This, itself, is a serious problem that needs to be addressed.

20. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-106(b)(1)(ii) (2004).
21. See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
22. See infra Part IV.C.2.a.
23. See infra Part IV.A.
24. See infra Part LV.B.
25. E.g., Bauerlien v. Warden, 236 Md. 346, 348, 203 A.2d 880, 881 (1964) (noting that
a postconviction petitioner was unable to get a copy of the trial transcript because "in the
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In any event, the larger number of meritless claims in collateral proceedings, including initial postconviction proceedings, can threaten
to obscure the meritorious ones.
The goal, of course, is to find the balance among interests in finality, judicial economy, fairness (to both the petitioner and the
state), and equal enforcement of the law. Although these interests are
usually described as ",competing," in the most basic sense they are consistent. Both the state (on behalf of the people it represents) and the
convicted defendant have a deep common interest in remedying a
wrongful conviction. Many years ago, the Court of Appeals of Maryland made this point in reaffirming that every judge in Maryland, acting as a "conservator of the peace," has the power to issue the writ of
habeas corpus.2 7 This is because "every case of unlawful imprisonment is a violation of the peace of the State, as well as of the right of
28
the citizen."
II.
A.

THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF STATE COLLATERAL REMEDIES

The Development of a Strong FederalRole in the Protection of the
Rights of CriminalDefendants Before and After Conviction

During the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the Supreme Court began to
recognize new constitutional rights of state criminal defendants that
applied against the states.29 Although the Court eventually assumed a
strong role in defining and protecting the rights of criminal defendants, its initial steps, taken as part of the "incorporation" debate, were
tentative.30 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the federal
seven years since the trial . . . the reporter's notes have been lost or destroyed and the
dialogue of the trial cannot be recreated").
26. The Maryland Administrative Office of the Courts has asked a committee to examine the state's record-retention practices and policies. At a minimum, the central
records in a convicted defendant's criminal case should be retained and stored during the
period of that person's life. This would be a substantial change in the current practices,
under which key records are destroyed after twelve years, and transcription notes after
seven years.
27. In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 596 (1880) (holding unconstitutional a state law that limitedjudges' jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to the circuit in which the court sat,
because Maryland's Constitution requires that jurisdiction be "co-extensive with the limits
of the State").
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (invalidating a criminal
conviction based upon evidence obtained by pumping the defendant's stomach because
that method is "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (recognizing a constitutional right to
effective counsel in capital cases, applicable against the states).
30. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (rejecting the argument that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated, and made applicable against
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decisions 1 were motivating states, including Maryland, to make substantial changes in the remedies they provided to convicted defendants after direct appeal in order to keep pace with the Supreme
32

Court.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court expanded the
federal role in protecting the pretrial, trial, and postconviction rights
of defendants in criminal cases. The Court rendered a series of decisions, some on direct appeal 33 and others in federal habeas corpus
cases, 3 4 which revolutionized criminal procedure.
As the Supreme Court expanded the rights of criminal defendants, it thereby increased the types of claims that state prisoners could
raise by federal habeas corpus. There are differing views about when
the Supreme Court and Congress determined that the scope of federal habeas corpus should encompass all federal constitutional
the states, the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy guarantee absent a "hardship so acute
and shocking that our polity will not endure it"); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50-51
(1947) (rejecting the argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated, and made applicable against the states, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination). But see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding the
Fifth Amendment to be applicable against the states); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment, applicable to both the federal government
and the states, prohibits commentary by the prosecution or the court on the defendant's
silence); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (overturning Palko).
31. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding unconstitutional the
denial of counsel on appeal to convicted indigent defendants); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956) (holding that an indigent appellant is constitutionally entitled to a free copy of
the trial transcript); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (considering on habeas review not
only procedural questions, but also the merits of constitutional claims).
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, required states to provide jury trials
to criminal defendants when the federal government would be obligated to do so); Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (holding that the defendant was denied the right to
a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited the state from introducing statements made by defendants during custodial interrogation without specified
warnings).
34. E.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (holding that the federal rule that jeopardy
attached when a jury was sworn and empanelled was an integral part of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy and therefore applied against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited introduction of
evidence of identification obtained after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings and in the absence of counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, required
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in any prosecution for a crime punishable
by imprisonment).
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claims. 3 5 However, there seems to be a consensus that by 1953, after
the Court decided Brown v. Allen,3 6 this was the rule.3 v
B.

The Federal Retrenchment

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court and Congress reversed field by significantly restricting the extent to which state prisoners could use federal habeas corpus to challenge unconstitutional
convictions and sentences.38
35. Compare Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.441, 463-99 (1963) (tracing the development of federal habeas
law and arguing that the principle that a final decision rendered by a competent state
tribunal could be revisited in a federal habeas proceeding did not exist before the Court's
1953 decision in Brown v. Allen), with Gary Peller, In Defense ofFederal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 I-IARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 610-63 (1982) (arguing that prisoners historically
could use federal habeas corpus to assert due process rights). Hertz and Liebman urge a
third view: historically, the scope of federal habeas has included "claims of particular national importance," including "recognized constitutional claims." 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN,
supra note 13, at 3940.
36. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
37. See I HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at 67-69; Bator, supra note 35, at 463; Peller,
supra note 35, at 583. In 1976, the Supreme Court held thatfederal habeas petitioners
could not assert claims based on the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment that was conceived in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). The Court noted that because it characterized that rule as "ajudicially created
remedy rather than a personal constitutional right," unlike rights clearly granted by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, its decision was "not concerned with the scope of the habeas
corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims." Id. at 495 n.37.
38. The Supreme Court, for example, ruled that, with limited exceptions, federal
courts could not apply "new rules," defined expansively, in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (overruling Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965)). Further, the Court strictly defined and enforced procedural default rules. See,
e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (holding that a lawyer's three-day
late filing of an appeal from a state habeas decision waived his client's right to assert state
habeas claims in a federal habeas proceeding since the client could not "demonstrate
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,
or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims [would] result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"). The Court also held during this time period that federal habeas petitions containing multiple claims, some exhausted and some procedurally valid, must be
dismissed. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions curtailing the use of federal habeas in the 1980s, see FrankJ. Remington, State Prisoner Use of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedures: State PrisonerAccess to Postconviction Relief--A
Lessening Rolefor Federal Courts; An Increasingly ImportantRole for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
287 (1983).
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court, acting on direct review, has recognized
important constitutional rights of criminal defendants, especially in capital cases. See, e.g.,
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that Arizona's capital punishment statute
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial where a judge, without
involvement of ajury, was authorized to make a factual determination about the existence
of aggravating evidence for the purpose of imposing a stricter sentence); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of a mentally retarded defendant is an
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In 1996, Congress consolidated and expanded these restrictions
by enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
In summary form, these amendments to the federal
(AEDPA).
habeas corpus statute: (1) impose a one-year statute of limitations for
4°
the filing of habeas corpus petitions in noncapital cases and 180 days
in capital cases;4 1 (2) require federal courts to give substantial deference to factual findings of state courts, assuming certain conditions
are satisfied;4 2 (3) require federal judges to accept substantive decisions of state judges that are fairly adjudicated and explained even if
those decisions are incorrect, as long as they are not "contrary to...
clearly established [Supreme Court] law" and are not "an unreasona4
ble application of [Supreme Court] law;" " (4) prohibit federal judges
from applying any rules other than ones that, due to retroactive application, were in effect at the time of the highest state court decision in
order to support the development of a factual claim not considered in
the state court proceeding;4 4 and (5) generally prohibit federal judges
from deciding the merits of a claim when the petitioner, usually
through counsel, violates a state procedural rule (for example, by failing to make a timely objection) and the petitioner cannot demon45 Some of
strate "cause" for the default and "prejudice" therefrom.
these rules codified rules from Supreme Court decisions, while others
are more restrictive than prior Supreme Court decisions.
The result of these amendments is that federal habeas relief is
generally available only to correct an egregious misapplication of a
narrowly defined and clearly established Supreme Court ruling that
was in effect at the time of the state court decision (no matter what

the rules may be at the time of the habeas proceeding). Even then, it
is only available if the petitioner's prior lawyers preserved the argument, the petitioner is confined in a federal circuit that will reasona"excessive" punishment under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment).
39. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
41. Id. § 2263(a).
42. Id. § 2254(e).
43. Idt.§ 2254(d).
44. Id. § 2254(e) (2).
45. Id. §§ 2244(b), 2254. There are narrow exceptions to this two-part requirement,
including a showing of actual innocence. See infra Part IV.C.2.a. The result of the AEDPA
and the earlier Supreme Court decisions is that "[flederal habeas litigation is now overwhelmingly concerned with the procedural posture of an inmate's constitutional claims
rather than with the merits of those claims." Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction
Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of
Excessive Proceduralism,1998 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 315, 317.
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bly apply the habeas rules, and the petition is filed within the
deadline. For many prisoners, this last requirement, by itself, may be
prohibitive due to the delays in state postconviction litigation. Because of the sheer volume of state noncapital postconviction cases, the
time it takes to investigate and prepare the state petition, and the resulting delay in providing counsel to state inmates, there is a real risk
that the one-year statute of limitations for filing the federal habeas
petition will run in a number of cases before the inmate's lawyer can
file the state petition.
The result of these factors is that the federal habeas corpus check
on state court interpretations of the United States Constitution has
been effectively eliminated in most cases.
C.

The Reduced Use of the State Clemency Power

The state judicial responsibility is enhanced by another factor,
the substantially reduced use of executive clemency as a last-resort
remedy for wrongful convictions and unnecessary incarceration.4 6
Clemency is a plenary, discretionary executive power.4 7 Some states
vest this power solely in the governor.4 8 Some vest the power in an
independent board.4 9 Others provide for a shared clemency power,
between the governor and others.5 ° Many states, including Maryland,
46. I use the term "clemency" generically to include unconditional pardons, conditional pardons, commutations of sentences, stays of execution and reprieves, and any other
type of executive relief from criminal convictions or sentences. The use of clemency has
been the subject of much scholarship. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline ofExecutive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1990-91); Alyson Dinsmore, Clemency in CapitalCases: The Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UClA L. REv. 1825
(2002); Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate ofRetributiveJustice: Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures,25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 413 (1999); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital
Clemency, 17J.L. & POL. 669 (2001); Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving
Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 219 (2003); Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme
Court's Reliance on Commutation to EnsureJustice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REv. 311
(1996); Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Cases,
27 U. RICH. L. REv. 289 (1993).
47. See, e.g., Bedau, supra note 46, at 257 (describing clemency decisions as "standardless in procedure, discretionary in exercise, and unreviewable in result").
48. See IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 7; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-17-101 to -102 (West
2004); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 15 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-21 (2004); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 13-10-1 to -2 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 809 (2000); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 5-1-16
(Michie 2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-801 (2003).
49. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-130a (West 2005) (formerly § 18-26); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-942 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-1000 (Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7727-5 (2003).
50. See Apaz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31402 (West Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.01
(West Supp. 2005); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 299 (West Supp. 2004); TEX. CODE CRaM.
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vest the power in the governor, but authorize a board or agency to
1
conduct investigations and make recommendations to the governor.
52
Other states have hybrids of these approaches.
Although there is data showing a substantial decrease in the use
53
of the federal clemency power by the President, state data is not
PROC. ANN. art. 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.885 ann.
(West 2003).
51. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4361-4364 (2005); HAWAn REV. STAT. ANN. § 353-72
(Michie 2004); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-13 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-9-2-2
(Michie 2003); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 914.1-.7 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3701 (Supp.
2004); Ky. CONST. § 77; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439.450 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2161-2164 (West 2003); MD.CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-206(3), 7601 (2004); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 127, §§ 152, 154 (West 2002); MICH. CONST. art. V,
§ 14; MICH. COMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 791.243-.244 (West 2004); Miss. CONST. art. V, § 124;
Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-31 (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217.800 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4:21-:25 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:167-4 (2005); N.M. CONsT. art. V, § 6; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-21-17 (Michie 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-55.1-02, -04 (2003); OHIO REV.
57, §§ 332, 332.2 (West 2004); S.D.
CODE ANN. § 2967.02 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
CODIFIED LAws § 24-14-1 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-27-101, -28-126 (2003); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 53.1-229 to -231 (2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 304.08 (West 2005); see also Act to
Amend Provisions Concerning Clemency Procedures, 2005 ARK. Acrs 1975, sec. 3, § 16-93204.
52. See ALA. CODE § 15-22-36(a) (2004) (the primary authority to grant pardons rests
with the Board of Pardons and Parole, with the exception that only the governor has the
authority to commute death sentences); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4800-4801 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005) (the Board of Prison Terms may "report" cases to the governor for consideration); CAL. CONsT. art. V, § 8 (the governor has clemency power, although in cases in
which a prisoner has been convicted of two or more felonies in separate proceedings, a
majority vote by the California Supreme Court is required to grant clemency); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15:572 (West 2005) (the governor has power to grant a reprieve, but approval
of the Board of Pardons is needed for a full pardon, and a first-time offender is automatically pardoned after completion of his sentence); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.01 (West 2003)
(the governor is one of three members of a Board of Pardons that has clemency power);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-301 (2004) (the governor makes the final clemency decision,
however, in noncapital cases, there must first be a positive "recommendation" from the
Parole Board); NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (the governor is one of three members of the
Board of Pardons, which has clemency power); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 213.010 (Michie
2004) (the governor is one member of the Board of Pardons, which also includes justices
of the state supreme court and the attorney general); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.225, 144.649
(2003) (the governor has clemency power, although in a limited number of cases, a court
may "set aside" a conviction after a sentence is served).
53. On the federal level, the power to grant clemency is vested in the President. Article
II, § 2 of the United States Constitution states: "The President . . . shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons.... ." During the past three decades, executive clemency has
been granted with decreasing frequency. Between the administrations of Calvin Coolidge
(1923-1929), and Lyndon B. Johnson (whose administration ended in 1969), every President issued at least 1,150 grants of executive clemency in some form, with the exception of
John F. Kennedy, who issued 575 such grants in his abbreviated administration. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Federal Executive Clemency in the United States, 1789-1995: A Preliminary Report (1995), available at http://ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/-PeterR/Papers/paper3.htm. Beginning
with Richard Nixon, however, the exercise of the federal clemency power has decreased
substantially. President Nixon issued 926 grants of clemency, and no President since then
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readily available. 54 Nonetheless, it appears that governors and other
clemency decisionmakers generally have become less willing to use
the clemency power. Professor VictoriaJ. Palacios contends that "the
commutation power is virtually dead because of the belief that 'super
due process' has virtually eliminated error and because the political
consequences of granting commutations are too great. ' 55 With regard to clemency in capital cases, she concludes that "[i]n the last
quarter century, there has been a dramatic decline in death penalty
commutations-so much so that some say the clemency power is now
defunct." 56 Adam M. Gershowitz agrees, stating that "[t]he decline in
executive clemency has been well documented (and lamented).'
Although Gershowitz's claim that the decline has been well-documented
may not be accurate, his underlying conclusion seems to be generally
accepted.
This decline in clemency comes at the same time that a number
of federal judges, including ChiefJustice Rehnquist, point to the existence of executive clemency as a reason to limit the scope of federal
habeas corpus, and as a justification for unforgiving rules of procedu58
ral default.
The reinstitution, in Maryland, of the traditional policy of considering for parole or commutation prisoners sentenced to life with parole is laudable.5 9 However, the use of that power still is quite
limited.60
D.

The Enhanced Role of State Judges and the Increased Importance of
State CollateralRemedies

Several state appellate courts have recognized that the above limitations, especially those on federal habeas corpus, justify a more
issued more than 600. See Ruckman, supra. Even with the glut of last-minute pardons
handed down by President Clinton, his total number of clemency grants was only 456.
Jonathan Peterson & Lisa Getter, Clinton Pardons Raise Questions of Timing, Motive, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2001. These data justify the conclusion that "[t]he presidential clemency
power has atrophied in the last half century." Palacios, supra note 46, at 348.
54. See Bedau, supra note 46, at 262 (noting that "[r]eadily accessible published information leaves much to be desired"); Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 46, at 291 (noting that
"there is no single source which provides statistics regarding the frequency of clemency
and the names of prisoners who are awarded clemency in capital cases").
55. Palacios, supra note 46, at 313 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 348.
57. Gershowitz, supra note 46, at 671 (citing Palacios, supra note 46).
58. See Palacios, supra note 46, at 335.
59. See supra note 18.
60. See supra note 18.
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6
searching level of review in state collateral cases. State v. Preciose is a
representative example.
In Preciose, the defendant filed a postconviction petition challenging the effectiveness of his lawyer, who represented him at trial and on
appeal. The postconviction court denied relief, and the intermediate
appellate court affirmed, holding that Preciose had waived his ineffec6 2 In an unreported
tiveness argument by failing to make it earlier.
opinion, the intermediate appellate court said it was expressly grounding its decision on this state procedural default to preclude federal
63
habeas review of the merits of the argument.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that Preciose
had not waived his claims, and that he had established, prima facie,
that his lawyer was ineffective.6 4 The opinion admonished the state's
judiciary about the importance, particularly given the federal "retrenchment," of deciding issues on the merits rather than relying upon procedural defaults:

It would be a bitter irony indeed if our courts, in an attempt
to accommodate the Supreme Court's retrenchment of federal habeas review, were artificially to elevate procedural rulings over substantive adjudications in post-conviction review,
at a time when the Court's curtailment of habeas review
forces state prisoners to rely increasingly on state post-conviction proceedings as their last resort for vindicating their state
and federal constitutional rights. .

.

. [W]hen meritorious

issues are raised that require analysis and explanation, our
traditions of comprehensive justice will best be served by decisions that reflect thoughtful and thorough consideration
5
and disposition of substantive contentions.6
The court emphasized that state courts, unlike their federal counterparts, cannot justify procedural default rules with federalism-based
arguments:
The Supreme Court's deference to state procedural bars is
based largely on comity and federalism-concerns that simply do not apply when this Court reviews procedural rulings
by our lower courts. Indeed, considerations of federalism
dictate that our state courts should enforce New Jersey's
61. 609 A.2d 1280 (N.J. 1992).
62. Id. at 1284.
63. id. at 1287.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1294.
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post-conviction rules without attempting to emulate the federal habeas decisions.6 6
The court added that the federal deference to state rules of procedural default "presumes well-reasoned state procedural defaults that
may in fact be the result of hostility towards federal rights or federal
right-holders or of outmoded state procedures."6 7 To avoid this, the
court suggested, state courts ought to make sure that, under their
rules, arguments in collateral cases are resolved on the merits whenever reasonably possible. If state courts do not do so, they will support
"a theory of federalism that subordinates the vindication of
federal
constitutional rights to a state's enforcement of its procedural rules. 6 8
The court acknowledged that court decisions on the merits will produce more federal habeas decisions on the merits, but that is not inconsistent with the legitimate state interest in finality:
From our state perspective, finality is achieved when our
courts grant or deny post-conviction relief. Any state court
judgment later overturned by federal habeas review presumably will have been undeserving of finality. We are not so
convinced of our infallibility, or so jealous of our sovereignty,
as to deem federal habeas review an undesirable intrusion on
our adjudications

.

.

.

.

Where meritorious issues are

presented, our interest in affording defendants access to
both state post-conviction and federal habeas review outweighs our interest in finality through an unnecessarily-rigid
enforcement of state procedural rules. Simply put, considerations of finality and procedural enforcement count for little
when a defendant's life or liberty hangs in the balance.69

66. Id. at 1292. The opinion cited DAmico v. Manson, 476 A.2d 543, 545-56 (Conn.
1984), in which the state court had applied a "less-restrictive standard to state post-conviction petitions 'despite the later development of [the] more restrictive' [federal] standard
for federal habeas review." Preciose, 609 A.2d at 1292-93.
67. Preciose,609 A.2d at 1291. The court did not ignore the legitimate interests underlying procedural default rules. Such rules "achieve[ ] the important state goals of finality
and judicial economy," avoid "disconnected and piecemeal" litigation, and "prevent[ ] the

abuse of post-conviction proceedings." Id. at 1292 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 1291.
69. Id. at 1293. The court added: "Our compelling judicial interest in sustaining only
those convictions free from constitutional error is disserved by decisions of our courts or,
for that matter, federal courts that limit the availability of federal habeas review in cases in
which such review may be warranted." Id at 1281.
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MARYLAND COLLATERAL REMEDIES

A.

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Although the PCPA has displaced habeas corpus as the primary
vehicle for challenging the legality of one's conviction, state habeas
still is an important remedy in Maryland. Like PCPA remedies,
is in cus"habeas corpus remedies are available only if the defendant
70
probation."
or
parole
of
tody or subject to conditions
For example, it is a means by which a prisoner can challenge an
error by the Division of Correction (DOC) in calculating the prisoner's sentence,71 the DOC's failure to credit earned "good conduct
time" against a sentence, 72 the use of an invalid prior conviction as the
73
predicate for an enhanced sentence under a recidivism law, the retroactive application of a law requiring gubernatorial approval of parole, 74 and the unlawful revocation of a prisoner's release under
"mandatory supervision." 75

Relief in habeas cases can include release of the petitioner or
measures short of release. A court "need not choose simply between
70. Fairbanks v. State, 331 Md. 482, 492 n.3, 629 A.2d 63, 68 n.3 (1993); see MD. CODE
ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-702 (2004). In Fairbanks, the court equated the "custody"
requirements for state habeas corpus and postconviction proceedings. 331 Md. at 492 n.3,
629 A.2d at 68 n.3. It cited McMannis v. State, 311 Md. 534, 536 A.2d 652 (1988), in which
the court cited with approval federal decisions that extended the federal habeas corpus
"custody" requirement to include the conditions of both post-incarceration parole and pretrial release on one's own recognizance.
71. E.g., Md. Corr. Inst. v. Lee, 362 Md. 502, 766 A.2d 80 (2001) (holding that the
alleged failure by the Division of Correction to clarify a commitment record, in conflict
with the sentence announced orally by the sentencing court, is cognizable by habeas
corpus); accord Mateen v. Galley, 146 Md. App. 623, 807 A.2d 708 (2002).
72. E.g., Md. House of Corr. v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 261, 703 A.2d 167, 175 (1997).
"[A]n inmate is not required to utilize the [administrative] inmate grievance procedure,
and courts will entertain an inmate's petition for habeas corpus when the plaintiff alleges
entitlement to immediate release and makes a colorable claim that he or she has served
the entire sentence less any mandatory credits." Id. This holding was pursuant to MD.
CONsT. art. III, § 55, which "provides that 'the General Assembly shall pass no Law suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.'" Fields, 348 Md. at 260, 703 A.2d at
175. Prisoners who seek uncredited good time, which if credited would not entitle them to
release, must assert their claim through the administrative Inmate Grievance Office. If
such a challenge is unsuccessful, they can pursue appeals in circuit court, and from those
Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.
decisions, to the Court of Special Appeals. See, e.g.,
1026 (2000).
1024,
A.2d
753
324,
320,
Md.
359
Servs. v. Hutchinson,
73. Fairbanks,331 Md. at 488, 629 A.2d at 66.
74. Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898 (1990) (holding that such retroactive application violated the Ex Post Facto Clause).
75. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety& Corr. Servs. v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150
(1998). For pretrial inmates, habeas corpus also is the statutory mechanism to challenge
bail decisions. CTS. & Jut. PROC. § 3-707.
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discharge of the defendant and the denial of all relief, but may tailor
relief as justice may require. "76
The general statutory provisions authorizing appeals from final
judgments do not apply to habeas corpus. Rather: "An appeal may be
taken from a final order in a habeas corpus case only where specifically authorized by statute."7 7 There are four statutes pertaining to
appeals or applications seeking leave to appeal in habeas corpus
cases. 78 The one provision directly relevant to this article is section 7107 of the PCPA. 79 This provision abolishes appeals in habeas cases
when a habeas petitioner challenges "the validity of confinement
under a sentence of death or imprisonment."' 8 0 Rephrased, section 7107 has no effect on an appeal when the petitioner does not "challenge the legality of a conviction of a crime or sentence of death or
imprisonment for the conviction of the crime."8" The test is whether
the habeas petition seeks relief for which the PCPA provides a remedy.8 2 If it does, the decision denying or granting it is not
appealable.8 3
A prisoner still may use habeas corpus to challenge his conviction
and sentence, but, in order to understand this, and the development
of the primary postconviction remedy under the PCPA, a little history
is useful.
76. Lee, 362 Md. at 518, 766 A.2d at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Gluckstern, 319 Md. at 652, 574 A.2d at 906.
78. Id.
79. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-107 (2004) (formerly codified, with some different

language, at art. 27, § 645A(e)). The others govern appeals from a bail decision, an extradition decision, and a decision holding unconstitutional the law under which the petitioner was convicted. Gluckstern, 319 Md. at 652-53, 574 A.2d at 906; see MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 9-110 (2001) (formerly codified, with some different language, at art. 41,
§ 2-210); CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-706 to -707.
80. CrM. PROC. § 7-107(b).
81. Id. § 7-107(b) (2) (ii). The important, but sometimes elusive, distinction is between
a habeas challenge to the sentence, which is not appealable, and one to the detention,
which is. See, e.g.,
Lee, 362 Md. at 517, 766 A.2d at 88; Mateen v. Galley, 146 Md. App. 623,
807 A.2d 708 (2002).
82. See infra Part III.C.
83. In Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 724 A.2d 673 (1999), the court said that "[i]n 1965,
the Legislature added new language to the [PCPA] in subsection (e), which this Court has
interpreted as allowing appeals from habeas corpus cases 'in situations where the Post
Conviction Procedure Act did not provide a remedy, and thus was not a substitute for
habeas corpus.'" Id at 106 n.4, 724 A.2d at 676 n.4 (quoting Gluckstern, 319 Md. at 662,
574 A.2d at 912). In 1970, the General Assembly clarified that unsuccessful habeas corpus
petitioners could appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in those cases in which they were
not using habeas corpus to challenge their convictions or sentences. Act of May 5, 1970,
ch. 595, 1970 Md. Laws 1711, 1711-12 (codified as amended at CRIM. PROC. § 7-107).
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Prior to 1958, when the Maryland General Assembly enacted the
PCPA,8 4 the primary mechanism to challenge the legality of one's de8
writ
tention was a writ of habeas corpus. " Maryland's version of the
8 6 Parlaw.
can be traced to early fourteenth century English common
liament eventually reduced this common-law remedy to statute by enacting "'the famous habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II. c. 2,' [which]8 7 was
In
'frequently considered as another magna carta of the kingdom."'
amended at MD. CODE
84. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, 1958 Md. Laws 178 (codified as
CODE ANN. art. 27,
MD.
at
codified
ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -301 (2004); previously
§ 645A(a)).
remedies as
85. See generally Tomlinson, supra note 5. There were other common-law
remedy
postconviction
viable
a
remains
which
nobis,
well, including the writ of error coram
custody of the state. See
the
in
or
confined
longer
no
are
who
those
for
especially
today,
724 A.2d 673. "A writ of
Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647 (2000); Ruby, 353 Md. 100,
factual errors by a court."
correct
to
used
primarily
tool
law
common
a
is
nobis
coram
error
can still "bring before
Ruby, 353 Md. at 104, 724 A.2d at 675. Through it, a petitioner today
the case, and which were
of
trial
the
at
issue
into
brought
not
were
which
facts
court
the
if known by the court,
material to the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which,
425, 432, 109 A.2d 96, 99
Md.
205
State,
v.
Madison
judgment."
the
prevented
have
would
into the writ of error coram
(1954). In Skok v. State, the Court of Appeals breathed new life
back to 1838, which
nobis, and in the process "overrul [ed] a multitude of cases, extending
375 Md. 21, 50,
Educ.,
of
Bd.
v.
Harris
writ."
the
to
scope
had given an extremely narrow
Skok could appeal the
825 A.2d 365, 382 (2003). At the threshold, the court held that
27, section 645A(e) of the
decision of the circuit court denying him relief despite Article
corpus and others)
PCPA, which abolished appeals in coram nobis cases (as well as habeas
"which have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of incarceration under
at 653. The court held
sentence of death or imprisonment." Skok, 361 Md. at 63, 760 A.2d
served his or her senfully
has
who
Skok]
[like
one
to
apply
that this language did "not
of serious collateral contence and is using coram nobis to challenge a conviction because
the traditional scope
sequences." Id. at 63-64, 760 A.2d at 653. The court then expanded
with a significant collatof coram nobis by holding that a petitioner "who is suddenly faced
challenge the conviceral consequence of his or her conviction, and who can legitimately
nobis to challenge the
tion on constitutional or fundamental grounds," can use coram
The court limited its new
conviction based on "an error of law." Id. at 78, 760 A.2d at 661.
criminal conviction must
the
rule in several respects. First, "the grounds for challenging
Id. Second, "a presumpcharacter."
fundamental
or
jurisdictional
be of a constitutional,
of proof is on the coram
tion of regularity attaches to the criminal case, and the burden
be suffering or facing signobis petitioner." Id.Third, "the coram nobis petitioner must
760 A.2d at 661. Fourth,
79,
at
nificant collateral consequences from the conviction." Id.
nobis proceedings."
coram
in
raised
issues
to
applicable
are
waiver
of
"[b]asic principles
by a coram nobis
Id And fifth, "one is not entitled to challenge a criminal conviction
Id. at 80, 760
available."
then
is
remedy
law
common
or
statutory
proceeding if another
Skok).
(applying
(2005)
885
A.2d
866
A.2d at 662; see Parker v. State, 160 Md. App. 672,
quoted
court
the
(1945),
809
807,
A.2d
44
345,
341,
Md.
86. In Olewiler v. Brady, 185
[1923] 603 A.C. 609
from an English decision, Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien,
corpus: "It is perhabeas
of
origins
the
describe
to
lr.),
from
(H.L. 1923) (appeal taken
England, affording as it
haps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of
or confinement. It is of
does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint
year of Edward I."
immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third
COMMENTARIES
BLACKSTONE'S
3
(quoting
87. Olewiler, 185 Md. at 345"6, 44 A.2d at 809
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1809, the Maryland General Assembly "substantially re-enacted" the
English statute, "with some changes."88 In 1867, habeas was incorporated into the Maryland Constitution. 9
It was difficult, however, to adapt the historic writ to the needs of
the mid-twentieth-century criminal justice system. In some ways, the
writ provided too little; in others, too much.
Historically, the scope of the writ was exceedingly narrow. In
1880, in In re Glenn,9 ° the Court of Appeals said that "the sole inquiry
[in a habeas case] is, generally, whether the [trial court] had jurisdiction of the offence recited and of the person of the party accused, and
whether the judgment or sentence recited in the commitment be such
as the [court] was authorized by law to render or impose."9 Habeas
could be used only to challenge a conviction or sentence that was not
merely erroneous, but an absolute nullity.
In the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court took the first
steps in what would come to be called the "criminal law revolution."9 2
As the Court recognized new rights, state prisoners obtained more
claims that they might assert in state collateral proceedings. The
Supreme Court made it clear that prisoners could assert these rights on
federal habeas corpus 9 3 and that it would not defer to unreasonable
state procedural default rules.9 4
88. Id. at 346, 44 A.2d at 809.
89. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 55 ("The General Assembly shall pass
no Law suspending
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.").
90. 54 Md. 572 (1880).
91. Id. at 607. In Glenn, the court that issued the writ of habeas
corpus was not in the
circuit in which the conviction had been entered. Id. at 610.
The Court of Appeals suggested a broader role for habeas, in conjunction with a writ of
certiorari, if the court had
been in the jurisdiction in which the conviction had been imposed.
Id. Then, it might
have issued both a writ of habeas corpus (bringing the prisoner,
more precisely his "body,"
before the court), and a writ of certiorari (bringing the record
of conviction before the
court). Id. The prisoner then could "go behind the conviction
recited in the warrant of
commitment to question the regularity of the proceedings upon
which the conviction is
founded, or to impeach the conviction itself for errors therein,
other than the want of
jurisdiction in the premises." Id. at 609. The Court of Appeals
held, however, that in this
case, where an out-of-circuit court heard a habeas case and it was
"heard and determined
upon the return to the writ alone," the conviction was presumed
to be lawful. Id. at 607.
92. See Laurence A. Benner et al., CriminalJustice in the Supreme Court:
A Review of United
States Supreme Court Criminal and Habeas Corpus Decisions (October
4, 1999-October 1, 2000), 37
CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 288 (2001); Tibute to the HonorableRobert
C. Underwood, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REV. 857, 861; BruceJ. Winick, Presumptionsand Burdens
of Proofin DeterminingCompetency to
Stand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court's
New Due ProcessMethodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MiAMI L. REV. 817, 820 (1993);
see also supra Part II.A.
93. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
94. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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By comparison, in Maryland (as well as most other states), the
collateral remedies were more limited. This produced considerable
federal-state tension, which manifested itself most openly when federal courts had to decide whether to require state prisoners to exhaust
state remedies, and how much deference they ought to give to the
factual findings and legal conclusions of state courts. These tensions
Court first
surfaced in several Supreme Court decisions in which 9the
5 then openly
urged state courts to expand the scope of state habeas,
96
criticized the failure of states to do so, and finally suggested that
states might be obligated by the United States Constitution to adopt
97
adequate postconviction measures.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland answered this challenge in
98
1945 in Olewiler v. Brady. The court reiterated the basic rule that
state habeas corpus was available only to challenge a conviction that
was a "nullity." 99 But it went on to adopt something of a jurisdictional
fiction that the United States Supreme Court had devised in Johnson v.
Zerbs&'.° that constitutional errors, at least serious ones, could 1deprive
' 0 1 i.e.,
a court of its jurisdiction "in the course of the proceedings,"
02
a conviction a nullity.'
midway through a trial, and thereby render
courts' power to
95. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935) (noting the state
due process
without
"liberty
petitioner's
the
of
deprivation
a
remedy
to
use habeas corpus
"[u]pon
that
observing
and
States,"
of law in violation of the Constitution of the United
guard and
to
obligation
the
rests
Union,
the
of
courts
the
with
equally
the state courts,
enforce every right secured by that Constitution").
96. See generally Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 236 (1949).
that certiorari
97. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965) (per curiam) (noting
postconviceffective
an
provide
to
failure
state's
a
whether
consider
to
granted
had been
Amendment).
Fourteenth
the
of
Clause
tion remedy may violate the Due Process
98. 185 Md. 341, 44 A.2d 807 (1945).
99. Id. at 344, 44 A.2d at 808.
100. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
101. Id. at 468.
in which the dis102. In Zerbst, the Supreme Court reversed a federal habeas decision
knowingly and
not
had
petitioner
the
that
fact
trict court had denied relief, despite the
The Supreme Court
467.
at
Id.
counsel.
to
right
Amendment
Sixth
his
waived
voluntarily
with crime to
said that "[s]ince the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged
is an essential jurismandate
constitutional
this
with
compliance
counsel,
of
assistance
the
accused of his life or libdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an
represented by counsel
not
is
accused...
the
"[i]f
Therefore,
added).
(emphasis
Id.
erty."
the Sixth Amendright,
constitutional
his
waived
and has not competently and intelligently
depriving him of his
sentence
and
conviction
valid
a
to
bar
jurisdictional
a
as
stands
ment
explained: "A court's
life or his liberty." Id. at 468 (emphasis added). That is, the Court
the proceedings' due to
of
course
the
'in
lost
be
may
trial
of
beginning
the
at
jurisdiction
counsel, who has
failure to . . . provid[e] counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
or liberty is at stake."
not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life
stressed that the
Id. A conviction under these circumstances is void. Id. The opinion
"principles" limiting habeas corpus "must be construed and applied so as to preserve-not
465.
destroy-constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty." Id. at
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The Maryland Court of Appeals said that "[r]ecent Supreme Court
cases hold that through violation of certain constitutional rights in
criminal procedure a trial court may lose its jurisdiction 'in the course
of the proceedings,' and its judgment may therefore be void."1 3 The
Court of Appeals said, however, that this addition to the nullity-only
basis for habeas relief did not encompass "mere error," for example,
"as to the number of peremptory challenges
of jurors," or the errors
0 4

that Olewiler had alleged.1

If the restrictive scope of state habeas provided too little to prisoners, there were other aspects of habeas that provided too much.
Judicial decisions in habeas cases, whether granting or denying the
application for a writ, had no resjudicata effect. Therefore, prisoners
could file as many petitions as they wished.10 5 Neither party could
appeal a habeas decision, and thus there was no way to provide
finality.1 06
In 1945, the General Assembly responded, in part, to these
problems. It granted both the petitioner and the State the right to
appeal from a habeas corpus decision. 0 7 Although the General Assembly did not limit the petitioner's right to file successive petitions
before different judges, it did provide that, in a case in which a petitioner had been granted a hearing on a prior petition, a subsequent
judge could refuse to issue the writ, i.e., decide not to bring the petitioner before the court for a hearing. The subsequent judge was to
make this decision based on whether the successive petition presented
103. Olewiler, 185 Md. at 344, 44 A.2d at 808 (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S.
at 468).
104. Id. at 345, 44 A.2d at 808. The errors included that Olewiler and
his rifle, which he
used to kill the victim, had been unreasonably seized. Id at 343-44,
44 A.2d at 808. The
Court of Appeals pointed out that there was no dispute about Olewiler's
identity or that he
had shot the victim. Id. at 345, 44 A.2d at 809.
105. E.g., Ex parteBerman, 14 F. Supp. 716, 717 (D. Md. 1936); see
also Charles Markell,
Review of Criminal Cases in Marylandby Habeas Corpus and by Appeal 101
U. PA. L. REv. 1154,
1162 (1953).
106. See Berman, 14 F. Supp. at 717 ("Maryland practice provides for
issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus by any of the State Judges but does not provide
an appeal from their
decisions. The refusal of the writ in one case is therefore not regarded
as res adjudicata.").
107. Markell, supra note 105, at 1157 (discussing Act of April 23,
1945, ch. 702, § 3C,
1945 Md. Laws 768, 769). In 1947, the General Assembly amended
the statute "to substitute for a right of appeal a right 'to apply to the Court of Appeals ...
for leave to prosecute
an appeal therefrom.'" Id, (quoting Act of April 26, 1947, ch. 625,
§ 3C, 1947 Md. Laws
1562, 1563-64). Over the next few years, this substantially increased
the workload of the
Court of Appeals. John D. Alexander, Jr., Note, The Maryland Version
of the Uniform Post
Conviction ProcedureAct, with Special Reference to the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
19 MD.L. REv. 233,
235-36 (1959). In a 1958 report, the Maryland Administrative Office
of the Courts described the increases in the numbers of applications for leave to appeal
habeas decisions.
There were a total of 203 in the six years prior to 1956, 82 in 1956,
and 128 in 1957. Id. at
236 n.19.
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"new grounds of a substantial nature" or whether the prior grounds
'0
had been "fully and adequately presented."
The enactment of the PCPA in 1958 slowed the common-law
when
evolution of habeas corpus in Maryland by abolishing appeals
habeas is used to challenge convictions and sentences, and accelerated its statutory development. Section 7-107(b) (2) (ii) of the PCPA
habeas
indicates, by negative implication (by barring appeals), that
a "senof
or
may be used to challenge the "legality of a conviction"
PCPA-ortence." 10 9 Maryland Rule 15-304 gives the petitioner a
judge
habeas choice. When a petitioner files a habeas petition, "the
Post
the
under
petition
a
as
may order that the petition be treated
writin
consents
Conviction Procedure Act if the individual confined
ing or on the record and the judge is satisfied that the post conviction
110
proceeding is adequate to test the legality of the confinement."
consisThis alternative approach, in the discretion of the petitioner, is
text,
and
tent with the history of the PCPA."' In response to history
as
scope
same
appellate courts seem to accept that habeas now has the
2
the PCPA. 1
The choice offered to petitioners is weighted in favor of the
PCPA, however, to advance the goal of making the PCPA the uniform
collateral remedy. The PCPA provides counsel to indigent petitioners,'" 3 gives them a right to a hearing,'

4

and provides that an unsuc-

court "[a]ssum[ed], with108. Markell, supra note 105, at 1161. In a 1948 decision, the
of res judicatadoes not
doctrine
the
out deciding, that notwithstanding the Act of 1945,
[prior] decision is not
a
such
nevertheless
....
corpus
habeas
extend to a decision on
190 Md. 767, 772, 59
Warden,
v.
Eyer
without weight on a later application." State ex rel
the abuses of the
1953,
by
that,
thought
Markell
omitted).
(citation
A.2d 745, 747 (1948)
writ had been substantially redressed
of issuing the writ as a
by abolishing the general (though not universal) practice
giving a general right
by
and
it,
for
matter of course, without any showing of need
for the action of 37
law
the
of
statements
authoritative
substituting
of appeal, thus
in Maryland],
judges
trial
of
judges, of equal authority [apparently the number
court.
higher
any
by
review
to
subject
not
Markell, supra note 105, at 1163.
109. MD. CODE ANN., CrIM. PROC. § 7-107(b) (2) (ii) (2004).

110. MD. R. 15-304.
111. See infta Part III.C.1.b.
A. 2d 80 (2001), the
112. In Maryland CorrectionalInstitution v. Lee, 362 Md. 502, 766
the lawfulness of an
challenge
to
method
appropriate
an
is
corpus
"habeas
court said that
It quoted from the
89.
at
A.2d
766
517,
at
underlying conviction and detention." Id.
states:
which
Code,
Maryland
the
of
Article
Proceedings
Judicial
Courts and
from his lawrestrained
or
confined,
(a) Petition. A person committed, detained,
any other color or
under
or
offense
alleged
any
for
State
the
within
liberty
ful
habeas corpus to the
pretense or any person in his behalf, may petition for writ of
or restraint may
confinement,
detainer,
commitment,
the
of
cause
the
that
end
be inquired into.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-702(a) (2002).
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cessful petitioner can seek leave to appeal an adverse decision.' 15 The
habeas provisions do not provide these rights." 16
On the other hand, a habeas petitioner can file the petition with
any judge in the state,' 1 7 and the provisions that govern successive
petitions and the assertion of new grounds for relief are more flexible
11 8
than those in the PCPA.

B.

Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence

Maryland Rule 4-345 (a) provides that a "court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.""' 9 The motion is "part of the same criminal
proceeding" in which the sentence was imposed and is "not a wholly
independent action."12 It "simply grants the trial court limited continuing authority in the criminal case to revise the sentence."' 2'
In noncapital cases, Maryland's appellate courts have allowed litigants to bring a variety of claims about improper sentences, including
claims that: (1) no sentence could have lawfully been imposed, for
example, because the double jeopardy guarantee prohibited trial, and
therefore barred any sentence, on a charge; 1 22 (2) a sentence ex113. MD. CODE ANN., CIM. PROC. § 7-108 ann. (2004).
114. Id. § 7 -108(a).
115. Id. § 7 -109(a).
116. See CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-701 to -707; MD. R. 15-301 to -312.
117. CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-701; In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572 (1880).
118. Maryland Rule 15-303(e)(3) provides, if a petition otherwise
complies with the
rules, the judge shall grant the writ unless "the legality of the confinement
was determined
in a prior habeas corpus or other post conviction proceeding, and no
new ground is shown
sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ." If a petitioner alleges new
grounds, subsection
(e) (3) (C) requires the petitioner to demonstrate "good reason why
new grounds . . . were
not raised in previous proceedings." If a previous judge has given the
petitioner a hearing
on a petition "for release from confinement under the same commitment,"
the subsequent
judge has discretion to deny the writ. CTS. & Jun. PROC. § 3- 7 03(a).
"In exercising his
discretion the judge may consider whether new grounds of a substantial
nature appear to
exist for granting of the writ or whether the grounds for the issuance
of any former writ
were fully and adequately presented." Id. In contrast, the PCPA contains
a single-petition
limitation and stricter waiver rules. See infra Parts III.C.1.c, III.C.1.h.
119. MD. R. 4-345. The rule also authorizes courts to revise sentences
that are the products of "fraud, mistake, or irregularity," thus providing a remedy even
when a sentence is
not illegal. Id. 4-345(b).
120. State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183, 742 A.2d 508, 516 (1999).
121. Id. at 184, 742 A.2d at 516.
122. State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496-97, 659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995)
(holding that the
imposition of a sentence on a greater offense precluded a sentence
for a lesser-included
offense). The court in Griffiths suggested that there might be a constitutional
requirement
that Maryland provide a mechanism to challenge an unconstitutional
sentence:
In view of our holding that Maryland Rule 4-345 (a) provides an adequate
existing
procedure for vacating the sentence imposed on the lesser offense,
we need not
consider whether the constitutional imperative to prevent multiple
punishments
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ceeded the maximum authorized by law, for example, because it was
for a lesser-included offense and it exceeded the maximum sentence
23
for the greater offense;' and (3) although the sentence was authorized by law, a court erred procedurally in imposing it, for example, by
realizing it had discretion to suspend
imposing a life sentence without
124
all or part of that sentence.
Given the special need for reliable and accurate decisionmaking
of moin capital cases, the Court of Appeals has expanded the scope State,
125
v.
Evans
In
cases.
capital
in
sentences
tions to correct illegal
the court noted its earlier holding that a capital defendant may allege
in a Rule 4-345(a) motion that "an alleged error of constitutional dimension may have contributed to [a] death sentence, at least where
the allegation of error is partly based upon a decision of the United
States Supreme Court or of this Court rendered after the defendant's
2 6 Evans contended in his motion
capital sentencing proceeding."'
that the trial court had applied at his sentencing hearing "an amendment to the Maryland death penalty statute" that "became effective a
few months after the murders [for which he was convicted]," and that
this "violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Maryland constitutions. "127 The court allowed Evans to assert this claim as
an exception to the general rule that "a Rule 4-345(a) motion to cor-

would mandate vacatur of the sentence even in the absence of a state procedure
specifically authorizing that action.
Id. at 497 n.8, 659 A.2d at 882 n.8.
the maxi123. Gerald v. State, 299 Md. 138, 472 A.2d 977 (1984) (holding that, since
the lesserof
conviction
upon
defendant,
the
years,
ten
was
robbery
for
mum sentence
years).
included offense of assault, could not legally be sentenced to more than ten
(considering
(2003)
455
452,
A.2d
825
124. State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 174-75,
discretion to
"whether, on [the] record, the trial judge failed to recognize that he had the
that error
does
so,
if
and,
case,
this
in
imposed
suspend all or a portion of the life sentence
theoprocedural
several
under
filed
was
Chaney
proceeding").
sentencing
new
a
require
illegal
an
correct
to
motion
a
as
prosecuted
being
ries, but the appeal clarified that it was
note 135 and acsentence. See State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 352 A.2d 829 (1976); infra
A.2d 715 (1989)
558
315,
Md.
316
State,
v.
Corp.
companying text; see also Randall Book
sentence is not
illegal
an
correct
to
motion
a
of
denial
a
from
appeal
an
that
(holding
or probation).
parole,
imprisonment,
no
been
has
precluded by the PCPA when there
jeopardy and constidouble
violate
sentences
that
arguments
that
noted
court
Randall
The
to correct an
tute "cruel and unusual punishment[s]" are within the scope of a motion
by impermissible
illegal sentence, but the contention that the trial judge "was motivated
at 719.
considerations," is not within the scope of Rule 4-345. Id. at 322, 558 A.2d
(2004).
291
A.2d
855
248,
Md.
382
125.
835 A.2d 1105
126. Id. at 279, 855 A.2d at 309 (citing Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179,
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 (2004)).
127. Id. at 251, 855 A.2d at 292-93.
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rect an illegal sentence is not appropriate where the alleged illegality
'did not inhere in [the defendant's] sentence.'"128
The Evans court said it had established the death-penalty exception to this general principle in Oken v. State.1 29 In Oken, the court, in
a Rule 4-345 proceeding, considered and rejected the argument that
Maryland's death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it does
not require, before the jury imposes death, that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances.'1 0 Both Oken and Evans based their
arguments on Supreme Court decisions rendered after their capital
13 1
sentencing proceedings.

Maryland's appellate courts have narrowly described the scope of
claims cognizable in a Rule 4-345 motion in a noncapital case. The
court in Evans, for example, said: "A motion to correct an illegal sentence ordinarily can be granted only where there is some illegality in
the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been imposed."1 3 2 That is, "a trial court error during the sentencing proceeding is not ordinarily cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) where the
resulting sentence or sanction is itself lawful."'3 3
The scope, however, may be somewhat broader, as measured by
the application of these principles. In State v. Kanaras,3 4 a decision
that the Evans court cites, the Court of Appeals allowed an appeal of a
Rule 4-345 ruling on the question of whether an event subsequent to
the imposition of sentence-Governor Glendening's refusal to consider parole for life-sentenced prisoners-retroactively changed lifewith-parole into life-without-parole sentences, in violation of the prohibition of ex post facto laws. And, in State v. Chaney,l1 5 the court
considered a case where the allegedly illegal sentence was within legal
limits, but the trial court allegedly imposed the sentence without
knowledge that it had the discretion to suspend all or part of it.
There are important procedural features of a Rule 4-345 motion
that the other collateral remedies do not share. For example, the revisory power under the rule is not subject to the restrictions that govern
128. Id. at 278, 855 A.2d at 309 (quoting State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170,
185, 742 A.2d
508, 517 (1999)).
129. 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003).
130. Id. at 184-85, 835 A.2d at 1108.
131. Oken relied on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 166 (2000), and Ringv.
Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), and Evans relied on Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
132. Evans, 382 Md. at 278-79, 855 A.2d at 309.
133. Id. at 279, 855 A.2d at 309.
134. 357 Md. 170, 742 A.2d 508 (1999).
135. 375 Md. 168, 825 A.2d 452 (2003).
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PCPA petitions. Although res judicata and law-of-the-case principles
apply so courts need not entertain a successive motion that repeats
allegations that a court previously has rejected," 6 there is no statute of
limitations for filing the motion,1 3 7 the waiver rules under the PCPA
13 8
and there is a right of appeal from an adverse
do not apply,
13 9
decision.
On the other hand, unlike first-time postconviction proceedings,
courts need not appoint counsel to represent parties who file motions
to correct illegal sentences,1 40 and although a court may not grant
14 1
relief without holding a hearing, it can deny relief without doing so.

C.

The Maryland Postconviction Procedure Act

In 1958, Maryland became the second state to adopt the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA). a42 The Act protected a
136. See Scott v. State, 150 Md. App. 468, 474, 822 A.2d 472, 475 (2003) (holding that
the court was not "required to consider anew repeated motions" that rested upon "the
same facts" and allegations).
137. The rule specifically states that, as long as the sentence is illegal, the court may
correct it "at any time." MD. R. 4-345(a); Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 397, 829 A.2d 1007,
1014 (2003); Kanaras,357 Md. at 180, 742 A.2d at 514 (stating that the "trial court clearly
has the authority and responsibility to correct an illegal sentence at any time" (quoting
Carter v. Warden, 210 Md. 657, 124 A.2d 574 (1956))).
138. See Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985) ("[A] defendant
who fails to object to the imposition of an illegal sentence .. .waive forever his right to
challenge that sentence.").
139. In Kanaras,the court reexamined its inconsistent prior decisions about whether the
losing party could appeal a decision on a motion to correct an illegal sentence. 357 Md. at
183, 742 A.2d at 516. The court disavowed those decisions in which it had indicated that
the PCPA had abolished any right of appeal, noting that the language of the PCPA, which
bars appeals from "statutory remedies which have heretofore been availablefor challengingthe validity of incarceration," did not apply to motions to correct illegal sentences under Maryland
Rule 4-345(a). lId at 177, 742 A.2d at 512. The court quoted from Judge Eldridge's dissenting opinion in Valentine v. State, 305 Md. 108, 123, 501 A.2d 847, 854 (1985) (Eldridge,
J., dissenting), in which he said "the fact that the Maryland Rules have the force of law does
not mean that a rule is a statute." Kanaras,357 Md. at 183, 742 A.2d at 516. The Kanaras
opinion also pointed out that the PCPA barred appeals from actions that challenged "incarceration," and a motion to correct illegal sentence was neither an independent action,
nor was it limited to sentences that imposed incarceration. Id. at 183-84, 742 A.2d at 516.
140. See MD. R. 4-214(b). A convicted defendant who moves for a modification of his
sentence under 4-345(b) within the ninety-day period prescribed by that subsection has a
statutory right to counsel. State v. Flansburg, 345 Md. 694, 702, 694 A.2d 462, 466 (1997).
141. Subsection (e) (2) of Rule 4-345 refers to the denial of a motion without a hearing
and subsection (f) states that "[n]o hearing shall be held . .. until the court determines
that the notice requirements in section (e) (2) of this Rule have been satisfied." MD. R. 4345(e), (f).

142. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, 1958 Md. Laws 178 (codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -301 (2004)). In 1955, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws originally adopted the Uniform Act. UNIF. POsT-CONVICTION PROCEDURE A-r, 11A U.L.A. 267 (1995).

The 1955 Act was superseded by the 1966
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broad array of rights, placed limits on collateral litigation (especially
through resjudicata and "waiver" provisions), and took a step toward
unifying the various collateral remedies by making the postconviction
process the primary means of asserting collateral claims.1 43 By giving
state courts the first opportunity to adjudicate these claims, and by
creating a fair adjudicatory process, the General Assembly provided a
structure that would protect state decisions, and state sovereignty, during federal habeas review.
1.

Central Provisions of the PCPA.-

a. Eligible Petitioners.-The original Act provided that "[a] ny
person convicted of a crime and incarcerated under sentence of death
or imprisonment... may institute a proceeding under this Act." 44 In
1965, the General Assembly added to the list of eligible petitioners
1 45
people "on parole or probation.

UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, llA U.L.A. 274 (1995), which was superseded by
the 1980 UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11 U.L.A. 249 (1995). The 1980 Act
allows "[a] person convicted of and sentenced for a crime" to "institute a proceeding applying for relief" upon one of eight grounds. 1980 UNIF. POST-CONVITION PROCEDURE ACT
§ 1 (a), 11 U.L.A. at 249-50.
143. See generally Tomlinson, supra note 5; Alexander, supra note 107. Today, every state
provides convicted defendants with at least one type of postconviction remedy; many provide multiple remedies. See generally WILKES, supra note 4, at 16-30. Fifteen states have
enacted some version of the UPCPA, and these acts remain in force in twelve of those
fifteen states. As of July 2004, the ten states that'currently have some statutory version of
the UPCPA are Maryland, Montana, Oregon (primarily based on the original 1955 version
of the UPCPA); Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Carolina
(primarily based on the 1966 revision); and North Dakota (primarily based on the 1980
revision). MD.CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -301; MONT.CODE ANN., §§ 46-21-101 to
-111 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.005-.504. (2005); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-4901 to -4911
(Michie 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 822.1-.11 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 590.01-.06
(West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 332 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-9.1-1 to -12
(2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 2932.1-01 to -14 (2003). Additionally, Arkansas, Nevada and South Dakota enacted versions
of the UPCPA, but then repealed them. Wilkes points out that two additional states, Alaska
and Indiana, have adopted some form of the UPCPA by court rule. WILKES, supra note 4,
at 214; see ALASKA R. 35.1; IND. R. PCI.
144. § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
145. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 645A(a), 1965 Md. Laws 634, 634. In McMannis v.
State, the Court of Appeals held that a West Virginia prisoner whose sentence was enhanced under that state's recidivist statute, but predicated on an earlier Maryland conviction, could not use Maryland's PCPA to challenge the earlier sentence. 311 Md. 534, 536
A.2d 652 (1988). The court noted that to invoke the PCPA, one had to be in Maryland's
custody, i.e., incarcerated or on parole or probation in Maryland. Id. at 539, 536 A.2d at
654. The court declined to broadly construe the custody requirement, despite the expansive interpretation of similar federal statutes by federal courts, saying that
where a person in another state has fully served a sentence imposed by Maryland
and is in no sense being detained by, or at the direction of, Maryland, the challenge to an earlier Maryland conviction that is having some collateral, albeit sig-
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b. Claims Within the Scope of the Act.-The Act consolidated
the collateral process by bringing within it claims that had been cognizable under habeas corpus and other common-law writs. Under the
original Act, petitioners could assert
that the [trial] court was without jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore
available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis,
or other common law or statutory remedy.'4 6
The current Act contains these provisions with minor nonsubstantive
revisions.147

Most important, in enacting the PCPA, the General Assembly also
expanded the scope of collateral relief by providing that petitioners
could allege "that the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation
of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of
this State. ' 48 This liberated the collateral remedy from its habeas history, which initially had allowed relief only when convictions were nullities. It gave the state courts the mechanism they needed to provide
more complete relief to collateral petitioners, including relief that implemented federal court decisions, and thereby helped to protect
state court decisions in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
The original grounds for postconviction relief remain the
grounds for relief under the Act today.1 49
c. The Number of Permissible Petitions.-Over thirty-seven
years, the General Assembly has reduced the number of petitions one
1 50
to one with an opportunity to recould file from unlimited to two,

open "in the interests of justice." 15

The articulated goal, as it has

nificant, consequence upon the petitioner's imprisonment because of the law of
the state of imprisonment should more properly be brought in the state that confines him.
Id at 54142, 543, 536 A.2d at 656.
146. § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
147. CRIM. PROC. § 7-102 (a) (2)-(4). As discussed in Part II, the PCPA did not eliminate
the writ of habeas corpus nor any of the other common-law and statutory collateral remedies, but it moved towards a unified system by abolishing the right of appeal for those
remedies that "have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of incarceration
under sentence of death or imprisonment" when petitioners used them to assert claims
cognizable under the PCPA. § 645A(b), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
148. § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
149. CRIM. PROC. § 7-102.
150. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 647, 1986 Md. Laws 2387, 2388.
151. ClM. PROC. §§ 7-103, 7-104. The one-petition-only amendment, with the "interests
ofjustice" reopening caveat, was enacted in 1995. See infra Part IV.B.
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been with federal habeas corpus, has been to give petitioners one full
and fair opportunity to litigate their collateral claims.
"As originally enacted in 1958, the Act did not place any limit on
the number of post conviction petitions which a petitioner was entitled to file." 152 The original Act contained a provision, repealed in

1965 as part of a series of amendments,153 which provided:
All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner under this Act
must be raised in his original or amended petition, and any
grounds not so raised are waived unless the court on hearing
a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted
therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the
154
original or amended petition.

This original provision is interesting because it resembles the basic structure of the current Act. Under the original Act, the petitioner
could file an original and amended petition, and could file a subsequent petition if the claims in the second petition "could not reasonably have been raised" before. 15 5 Today, a petitioner can file a single
petition, with "freely allowed" amendments "in order to do substantial
justice,"'15 ' and can subsequently reopen that proceeding if "the inter15 7
ests of justice" warrant it.

In 1986, the General Assembly limited the number of petitions a
prisoner could file to two. 1 5

The Court of Appeals held that the new

two-petition-only provision could not be applied retroactively. 15 9
In 1995, the General Assembly reduced from two to one the number of postconviction petitions that a petitioner can file but added the
"interests ofjustice" reopening provision noted above. 160 In Part IV.B,
I trace the legislative history of this provision, and make some suggestions about how courts might interpret it.
d. Statutes of Limitations.-The original Act had no statute of
limitations. It provided that a petition could "be filed at any time."161
152. Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 217-18, 522 A.2d 1344, 1345 (1987).
153. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 2, 1965 Md. Laws 634, 636; see infra Part III.C.l.h.
154. § 645H, 1958 Md. Laws at 181.
155. Id. The General Assembly deleted this provision in 1965 when it added new waiver
provisions to the Act. 1965 Md. Laws at 634; see Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 951-53.
156. MD.R. 4-402(c).
157. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-104 (2004).
158. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 647, 1986 Md. Laws 2387, 2388.
159. Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 221-22, 522 A.2d 1344, 1347 (1987).
160. Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 258, 1995 Md. Laws 1473, 1482. For the effect of these
amendments on prisoners who had filed previous petitions, see Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1,
728 A.2d 1280 (1999).
161. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, § 645A(b), 1958 Md. Laws 178, 179.
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In 1991, the General Assembly established a statute of limitations for
filing initial capital postconviction petitions, requiring that they be
filed 240 days after decision by the United States Supreme Court on
direct appeal (either affirming the death sentence or denying certiorari), or the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari from the
1 6 2 The new provisions authorized a
Supreme Court on direct appeal.
court to extend time for filing an initial capital postconviction petition
for good cause.16 3
The 1991 General Assembly rejected a proposed three-year16 4statpetitions.
ute of limitations for filing noncapital postconviction
In 1995, the General Assembly imposed a ten-year statute of limitations for noncapital postconviction petitions, absent 1"extraordinary
only. 65
cause," but gave that provision prospective effect
The 1995 revisions also reduced from 240 to 210 days the period
petition,' 66
of time a death-sentenced prisoner has to file his initial
established the ground rules for capital offenders who wish to waive
167 and established or modtheir rights to file postconviction petitions,
for the litigation of capital postconviction
ified timelines
168
proceedings.
162. Act of May 24, 1991, ch. 499, § 645A(a) (3), 1991 Md. Laws 2992, 2996. The initial
proposal for the statute of limitations was 180 days. See id. at 2995.
163. Id at 2996.
164. The proposed provision, which was deleted by amendment, provided: "[A] petition shall be filed within 3 years after the challenged conviction has become final unless
extraordinary cause for the delay is shown." See id- at 2995. It made an exception for new
decisions to be applied retroactively. Id. at 2997.
165. In 1995, the General Assembly amended subsection (a) (2) of § 645A. Act of May 9,
1995, ch. 258, 1995 Md. Laws 2091, 2091-92. As amended, it provided: "Unless extraordinary cause is shown, in a case in which a sentence of death has not been imposed, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed later than 10 years from the imposition of
sentence," and "[ t] hat this Act shall be construed prospectively to apply only to postconviction proceedings for sentences imposed on or after the effective date of this Act [October
1, 1995] and may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect on or application to
postconviction petitions for sentences imposed before the effective date of this Act." Id. at
2091-92. In Grayson v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the prohibition against filing a
petition more than ten years after sentencing did not apply to a sentence that was imposed
in 1966, making it clear that the latter provision means exactly what it appears to say. 354
Md. 1, 15, 728 A.2d 1280, 1286 (1999).
166. § 645A(a) (3), 1995 Md. Laws at 1482.
167. § 645A(a) (5), 1995 Md. Laws at 1483. This provision states that a defendant in a
case where a death sentence has been imposed may waive his right to a postconviction
petition. Id Such a waiver must be "[k]nowing, voluntary, intelligent; and. . . in writing,"
and the defendant may revoke such a waiver if he does so within fifteen days. Id
168. § 645A(g), 1995 Md. Laws at 1485. The capital prisoner's hearing must be set
within thirty days after the petition is filed, and must take place within ninety days after the
petition is filed. Id.
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e. Rights to Appointed Counsel and a Heaing.-The original
Act required that a court appoint counsel to represent indigent petitioners, 1 69 and contained ambiguous language about whether a hearing was mandatory."' 0 The Act did not specify how courts should deal
with multiple petitions.
In 1959, the General Assembly addressed this issue by authorizing
a court, after considering the State's response to a subsequent petition, to dismiss that petition without appointing counsel or holding a
hearing if the court found that the petition contained no ground for
relief that "could not reasonably have been raised in the original or
amended petition. "171
In 1983, the General Assembly made it clear that a hearing and
appointment of counsel for the first petition were mandatory. It added language to the Act providing that: "A petitioner is entitled to the
assistance of counsel and a hearing on the first petition filed by the
petitioner under this section. "172 Addressing subsequent petitions, it
said: "The court shall determine whether to grant assistance of coun1 73
sel or a hearing on subsequent petitions."

In 1986, when the General Assembly limited the number of petitions a prisoner could file to two, it authorized, but did not require, a
court to appoint counsel and hold a hearing on a "subsequent" (i.e.,
second) petition.

174

Similarly, in 1995, when the General Assembly reduced from two
to one the number of postconviction petitions that a petitioner can
file, and authorized courts to "reopen a postconviction proceeding
that was previously concluded if the court determines that such action
is in the interests ofjustice," it left within a court's discretion whether,
on a motion to reopen, it should appoint counsel to represent a peti1 75
tioner and hold a hearing.

169. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, § 645E, 1958 Md. Laws 178, 180.
170. Id. § 645G, 1958 Md. Laws 180-81. The Act precluded the trial judge from hearing
the postconviction petition unless the petitioner consented to this. Id. Maryland Rule 4406 now contains this provision.
171. Act of April 8, 1959, ch. 429, § 645H, 1959 Md. Laws 558, 560.
172. Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 234, § 645A(f), 1983 Md. Laws 910, 911.
173. Id.
174. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 647, § 645A(f), 1986 Md. Laws 2387, 2388.
175. Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 110, § 645A(a) (2), 1995 Md. Laws 1473, 1482. The original Act authorized the court to "receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or
other evidence." § 645G, 1958 Md. Laws at 181. This provision is now contained in Maryland Rule 4 -4 06(c). In Part IV.A, I argue that by authorizing proof by deposition, the
General Assembly intended to give courts discretion to allow at least limited discovery in
postconviction cases.
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The Qualified Right to Appeal.-The original Act provided
f
to the Court of Appeals, then Maryland's
for a discretionary appeal
17 6
court.
appellate
only
In 1966, the General Assembly amended the Act to divide responsibility for appeals between the Court of Appeals and the then-new
Court of Special Appeals. It vested sole jurisdiction in the Court of
Special Appeals to hear appeals in noncapital postconviction cases, by
leave of court, and sole jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals to hear
177 Current
appeals in capital postconviction cases, by leave of court.
law remains the same. 178 In construing the applicable provisions, the
Court of Appeals has drawn an important distinction: When the Court
of Special Appeals exercises its discretion either to grant or deny an
appeal, the Court of Appeals may not review that discretionary judgment. However, when the Court of Special Appeals grants leave to
appeal and decides the appeal, the Court of Appeals, through its1 certidecision. 79
orari power, may review, on the merits, that appellate
g. Res Judicata.-The original Act conditioned the right of
petitioners to bring a claim on the requirement that it "has not been
previously and finally litigated." 8 ° In 1965, the General Assembly added clarifying language. 8 1 It separated prior court decisions into appellate and trial decisions. With respect to appellate decisions, it said
that "an allegation of error shall be deemed to be finally litigated
for leave to
176. Such an appeal could be requested by filing an "appl[ication] ...
"applicaif
the
that
provided
Act
The
181.
at
Laws
Md.
1958
§
6451,
appeal."
prosecute an
tion is denied, the order sought to be reviewed shall thereby become final to the same
extent and with the same effect as if said order had been affirmed on appeal." Id.
177. Act of March 23, 1966, ch. 12, § 6451, 1966 Md. Laws 23, 33. The General Assembly
deleted language from section 6451 that provided that a denial of leave to appeal was a
final order "to the same extent and with the same effect as if said order had been affirmed
on appeal." Id. In 1976, the General Assembly removed references to appeals to the Court
of Appeals from the Act. Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 472, § 645A(e), 1976 Md. Laws 1234,
1243.
178. See MD. CODE ANN., CrIM. PROC. § 7-109 (2004); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD.

PROC. § 12-202 (2004) (providing that "review by way of certiorari may not be granted by
the Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of Special Appeals has
denied or granted: (1) Leave to prosecute an appeal in a post conviction proceeding").
179. Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 11, 728 A.2d 1280, 1285 (1999).
180. § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
181. There were several decisions prior to 1965 dealing with the "finally litigated" and
"waiver" issues. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Warden, 217 F. Supp. 579 (D. Md. 1963) (questioning
whether after the repeal by the PCPA of the right to seek leave to appeal habeas decisions,
the denial on procedural grounds of a Maryland prisoner's claim meant that the claim had
been "finally litigated"); Plater v. Warden, 220 Md. 673, 673, 154 A.2d 811, 811 (1959)
(holding that an issue raised in a postconviction proceeding had been "finally litigated" in
a prior habeas corpus proceeding when the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal the
lower court's denial of relief, thereby affirming that judgment).
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when the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision on the merits
thereof, either upon direct appeal or upon any considerationof an application
for leave to appeal filed [under the Act] ."182 The language is somewhat
confusing because denial of discretionary review is not usually considered to be a decision "on the merits." Maryland's appellate courts
have not squarely resolved whether a denial of leave to appeal means
that the claims in it have been "previously and finally litigated." The
Court of Special Appeals, however, has held that claims in a previous
postconviction decision have not been "finally litigated" when the petitioner did not seek leave to appeal.1 8 3
If denial of leave to appeal satisfies the "finally decided" test, this
should be a relatively weak form of res judicata. In later determining
whether to reopen a prior postconviction proceeding, a court should
keep in mind that there is no statutory requirement that counsel represent indigent prisoners who seek leave to appeal from adverse decisions. This leaves to indigent prisoners the task of preparing
appellate papers in many, often complex cases.
Also, the Maryland Rule governing "application[s] for leave to
appeal [postconviction decisions] to [the] Court of Special Appeals"
does not require, or allow, applicants to file the transcript of a postconviction proceeding, but only the pleadings in the case and the
often sparse conclusions of the circuit court.18 4 This may make it difficult for the appellate court to identify with reliability and accuracy
errors made by the lower court.
Furthermore, as with other discretionary decisions, like those on
certiorari, a decision to deny leave to appeal in a postconviction case
may reflect a variety of judgments unrelated to the merits of the issues, and once the Court of Special Appeals has exercised its discre-

182. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 645A(b), 1965 Md. Laws 634, 635 (emphasis reflects
new language). The comparable provision today is in Mo. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7106(a) (1), which provides: "For the purposes of this title, an allegation of error is finally
litigated when: (1) an appellate court of the State decides on the merits of the allegation:
(i) on direct appeal; or (ii) on any consideration of an application for leave to appeal filed
under [the Act]."
183. In Hadder v. Warden, the Court of Special Appeals held, consistent with the plain
meaning of the text of section 645A(b), that when a postconviction petitioner lost, but did
not seek leave to appeal, the claims in that proceeding had not been "finally litigated." 7
Md. App. 584, 587, 256 A.2d 549, 551 (1969). Reciting the language of section 645A(b),
the court said that "a contention cannot be deemed to have been 'finally litigated' where
there has been no decision on the merits thereof by the Court of Appeals or this Court
either upon direct appeal or upon consideration for leave to appeal." Id.; accord Sample v.
Warden, 6 Md. App. 103, 106-07, 250 A.2d 269, 271 (1969).
184. MD. R. 8-204(c).
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fion, and denied leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction to review that decision.' 8 5
h. Waivers of Claims and Exceptions to Waiver.-In overview
form, there is "a two-tier waiver rule that is part statutory and part
common law."' 8 6
The first tier includes claims based on rights that are "fundamen8
tal."" 7 The waiver rule for this tier is found in the Act. Under the
text of the Act, a petitioner has waived a claim when that petitioner
"could have made but intelligently and knowingly failed to make the
allegation" in a prior proceeding.' 8 8 Before this text was interpreted
by the Maryland Court of Appeals, it appeared to mean that absent an
informed and personal waiver by the petitioner, all claims were preserved. As interpreted, however, the "intelligently and knowingly" requirement applies only to claims based on a limited category of
"fundamental rights."' 8 9 These rights include those "for which the
United States Supreme Court has required an express, knowing, and
intelligent waiver. " 19
The second-tier rules-those governing the waiver of claims
based on nonfundamental rights-are to be found outside the Act, in
"case law or any pertinent statutes or rules." '' These rules generally
provide that actions and omissions of the lawyer bind the client, including procedural defaults.' 9 2
I now turn to the history of the waiver rules and a more detailed
discussion of these two-tier rules, including the exceptions to waiver.
The original Act precluded a petitioner from asserting an error
that had been "waived in the proceedings resulting in the conviction,
or in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure
relief from his conviction."'9 3 The Act did not define "waived."
In 1965, the General Assembly substantially revised the waiver
provision'" in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Fay v.
185. CRIM. PROC. § 7-109(b) (4).
186. Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 289 (4th Cir. 2000).
187. Id. at 289-90.
188. CRIM. PROC. § 7-106(b)(1)(i).
189. Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 149, 395 A.2d 464, 474 (1978).
190. Baker, 220 F.3d at 290 (citing McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 139-40, 617 A.2d 1068,
1070 (1993)); see infra Part III.C.l.h(2).
191. Curtis, 284 Md. at 149-50, 395 A.2d at 474.
192. See infra Part III.C.l.h(2).
193. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws 178, 179.
194. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 645A(c), 1965 Md. Laws 634, 635.
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Noia.'9 5 In Fay, the Court addressed "under what circumstances, if
any, the failure of a state prisoner to comply with a state procedural
requirement, as a result of which the state courts decline to pass on
the merits of his federal defense, bars subsequent resort to the federal
courts for relief on habeas corpus."'1 96 The Court held that a federal
court had "limited discretion" to deny habeas relief to an applicant,
but only to one "who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure
of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies."19' 7 The Court said: "The classic definition of waiver enunciated
in Johnson v. Zerbst-'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege'-furnishes the controlling standard.""'
The Court emphasized that, in order to satisfy the waiver standard, it
must be the petitionerwho, "after consultation with competent counsel
or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of
seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for
strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as
the deliberate by-passing of state procedures." '9 9 Therefore, "[a]
choice made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not
automatically bar relief. Nor does a state court's finding of waiver bar
independent determination of the question by the federal courts on
habeas, for waiver affecting federal rights is a federal question. '"200
The 1965 amendments to the Act had four basic components.
First, they incorporated the Johnson v. Zerbst standard: "[A] n allegation
of error shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have
made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation"
in prior proceedings.2 °1
Second, they created a rebuttable presumption that if "an allegation of error could have been made by a petitioner" in a prior pro195. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The legislative purpose underlying these revisions by the
General Assembly was "to adopt the concept of 'waiver' set forth by the Supreme Court in
cases like Johnson v. Zerbst and Fay v. Noia." Curtis, 284 Md. at 142, 395 A.2d at 470 (citations omitted). The votes on the final bill, H.B. 901, were unanimous in both the House of
Delegates (117-0) and Senate (29-0). See 1965 MD. HOUSEJOURNAL 1655; 1965 MD. SENATE
JOURNAL 1559.
196. Fay, 372 U.S. at 399.
197. Id. at 438.
198. Id. at 439 (citingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
199. Id.
200. Id. Subsequent to Fay, the Supreme Court, in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), and Congress, see supra Part II.B, abandoned the Fay waiver standard.
201. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 645A(c), 1965 Md. Laws 634, 635. The prior proceedings were "before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not said petitioner actually took such an appeal), in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually
instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner." Id.
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ceeding, "but was not in fact so made," the "petitioner intelligently
and knowingly failed to make such allegation."2 °2
Third, they added a forgiveness provision, authorizing a court to
excuse a waiver and resolve a claim on the merits if the petitioner
proves the existence of special circumstances.20 3
Fourth, they added a broad exception to both the waiver and "finally litigated" provisions for new constitutional standards developed
by the Supreme Court or either of Maryland's appellate courts, which
apply "retrospectively" and "affect the validity of the petitioner's conviction or sentence. "1204
With largely nonsubstantive changes, these provisions remain in
effect today.20 5 The judicial interpretations of these rules, however,
have added important glosses to the legislative text.
(1) Limiting the Statutory Waiver Definition to Claims Based on
FundamentalRights.-In 1978, in Curtis v. State,20 6 the Court of Appeals
held that the 1965 amendments defining "waiver" applied only to
claims based on "certain basic constitutional rights under circumstances where the courts have held that only such intelligent and
knowing action will bind the defendant."20 7 To waive a claim based
on such a fundamental right, petitioners themselves must intelligently
and knowingly relinquish the claim in an on-the-record proceed-

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. § 645A(d), 1965 Md. Laws at 635.
205. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC., § 7-106 (2004). To reflect changes in Maryland
criminal procedure, the current law has added to the proceedings in which a petitioner
might have waived a claim, "an application for leave to appeal a conviction based on a
guilty plea." Id.§ 7-106(b)(1)(i) (4).
206. 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978).
207. Id. at 148, 395 A.2d at 473. Curtis had filed a second postconviction petition in
which, for the first time, he argued that he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial, appellate, and first postconviction lawyers. Id at 134, 395
A.2d at 466. The parties stipulated that Curtis had "a seventh grade education and an l.Q.
of 72 (borderline range of intelligence)"; that there was evidence that he "was a chronic
alcoholic who had suffered some brain damage as a result of extended drinking for
nineteen (19) years"; that he "relied entirely on his court-appointed counsel at trial, on
direct appeal ...and in his first post-conviction case"; and that he "would have raised the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his prior post-conviction case had [he] known
that there was a possible issue of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 136, 395 A.2d at
467. The Court of Special Appeals held that Curtis had waived the argument that trial
counsel was ineffective by failing to assert it in his first postconviction proceeding and had
not proved either that his first postconviction lawyer was ineffective or that there were
special circumstances to excuse the waiver. Id. at 137, 395 A.2d at 467.
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ing.20 8 The "failure of counsel or an unknowing petitioner to raise
[such] an issue" is not a "waiver."2 °9
The court held that Curtis's claim, based on the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, is a first-tier claim
and therefore "is governed by the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of an 'intelligent and knowing' waiver." 2 10 The statutory presumption of
waiver, the court said, "can be rebutted by evidence or stipulated facts
showing that petitioner did not 'intelligently and knowingly' fail to
raise the issue previously. ' 211 The facts rebutted the presumption in
Curtis's case; he was therefore allowed to assert his claims.
The court adopted its two-tier approach from a line of Supreme
Court decisions in which the court sometimes applied the Johnson v.
Zerbst and Fay v. Noia waiver standards, and sometimes did not, "depend [ing] upon the nature of the right and the surrounding circumstances" in each case. 21 2 The court concluded that the Maryland
General Assembly "intended that the [section 645A(c)] waiver provision .

. . ,

with its express definition of waiver, be applicable only in

those situations where the courts have required an 'intelligent and
knowing' standard."2 3 To hold otherwise, the opinion said, would
mean that
every time counsel made a tactical decision or a procedural
default occurred, the result could be chaotic. For example,
under such an interpretation of the statute, for a criminal
defendant to be bound by his lawyer's actions, the lawyer
would have to interrupt a trial repeatedly and go through
countless litanies with his client.2" 4
In Wyche v. State,2 15 the Court of Special Appeals said: "Fundamental rights [within the meaning of the PCPA] have been defined as
208. In Wyche v. State, the court set forth a two-prong test for finding an "intelligent" and
"knowing" waiver: "1. The record expressly reflects that the defendant had a basic understanding of the nature of the right which was relinquished or abandoned; and 2. The
record expressly reflects acknowledgement that the relinquishment or abandonment of
that right was made or agreed to by the defendant." 53 Md. App. 403, 406, 454 A.2d 378,
379 (1983).
209. Curtis, 284 Md. at 139, 395 A.2d at 469. The Curtis opinion said that "the standard
of 'waiver' for purposes of the Act is whether 'the petitioner himself "intelligently and
knowingly" failed to raise the issue' or, stated another way, whether he was previously
aware of and understood the possible defense.'" Id. at 140, 395 A.2d at 469.
210. Id. at 150, 395 A.2d at 474.
211. Id. at 139, 395 A.2d at 469.
212. Id. at 147, 395 A.2d at 473.
213. Id. at 148, 395 A.2d at 473.
214. Id. at 149, 395 A.2d at 474.
215. 53 Md. App. 403, 454 A.2d 378 (1983).
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being, almost without exception, basic rights of a constitutional origin, whether federal or state, that have been guaranteed to a criminal
defendant in order to preserve a fair trial and the reliability of the
truth-determining process."2" 6 The court's list of "rights that have
been deemed fundamental" included
the right to counsel, the right to trial by jury, the right to be
properly advised before the acceptance of a guilty plea, the
right not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence,
the right against double jeopardy, the right to confrontation,
the right to a speedy trial, and the right to counsel at a post
right to effective
indictment pre-trial line up, as well as "the
2 17
trial."
criminal
a
at
counsel
of
assistance
Even if petitioner has personally-and knowingly and intelligently-waived a claim based on a fundamental right, a court can excuse that waiver if the petitioner demonstrates "special circumstances"
for excuse. 2 18 This is, however, a separate, second step in the analysis,
as the court in Curtis emphasized: "Where the record affirmatively
shows that there was not an intelligent and knowing failure to raise
[the issue], there is nothing to 'excuse,' and the presence or absence
of 'special circumstances' has no relevance."2 19
(2) The Waiver Rules That Apply to Claims Based on Rights
That Are Not Fundamental,and the Exceptions to These Rules.-The Court
of Appeals in Curtis said that these second-tier claims are "to be governed by case law or any pertinent statutes or rules," 22 ' and added:
"Tactical decisions, when made by an authorized competent attorney,
as well as legitimate procedural requirements, will normally bind a
criminal defendant." 22 1 Maryland's appellate courts have spent sev-

216. Id. at 406, 454 A.2d at 380.
217. I& (citations omitted). The court in Wyche apparently included in its reference to
the right of confrontation the right recognized in Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d
1301 (1981), of criminal defendants to be present at every stage of their trial, including at
a bench conference at which voir dire is conducted or a venire panel juror is excused.
Wyche, 53 Md. App. at 408, 454 A.2d at 380-81. The Court of Appeals said this right "isa
common law right, is to some extent protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and is guaranteed by Maryland Rule 724." Williams, 292 Md. at
211, 438 A.2d at 1306.
218. MD.CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §7-106 (b) (1) (ii) (2004).
219. Curtis, 284 Md. at 139, 395 A.2d at 468.
220. I& at 149-50, 395 A.2d at 474.
221. Id.at 150, 395 A.2d at 474.
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eral decades trying to identify the exceptions to these general waiver
principles. 2 2
In Walker v. State,22 1 the Court of Appeals summarized its prior
decisions by stating that "a court, in a post conviction proceeding, can
excuse a waiver [of a nonfundamental right] based upon an earlier
procedural default if the circumstances warrant such action. '2 24 Walker
had alleged, in his third postconviction petition, "that the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury that an intent to inflict severe injury was
sufficient to support a conviction for assault with intent to murder,
and that this error permitted the State to obtain his conviction without proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. ' 2 25 His trial lawyer, however, had not objected to the
instruction.
To overcome this procedural default, and his failures to challenge the instruction in his prior proceedings, Walker argued that the
waiver issue was governed by section 645A(c) .226 The opinion recognized that the rules that authorize "a court to take cognizance of
'plain error' despite the waiver of an issue, literally apply only to direct
appellate review of a judgment."227 The Court of Appeals also acknowledged that "the similar 'special circumstances"' exception to
waiver, "set forth in [the PCPA] ," applies only to "situations requiring
intelligent and knowing action before there is a waiver," i.e., waivers of
fundamental rights claims.2 28
The court, nevertheless, said that "[i] n effect, we have upheld the
application of the 'plain error' or 'special circumstances' principles to
222. See Cirincione v. State, 119 Md. App. 471, 512-17, 705 A.2d 96, 116-18 (1998) (surveying the applicable case law).
223. 343 Md. 629, 684 A.2d 429 (1996).
224. Id. at 647-48, 684 A.2d at 438 (emphasis added); accord Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256,
273, 681 A.2d 30, 38 (1996) ("this Court retains discretion to excuse waiver" at a postconviction proceeding).
225. Walker, 343 Md. at 633, 684 A.2d at 431.
226. See id. at 635, 684 A.2d at 432 (noting the circuit court's application of the "knowing and intelligent waiver" and the "special circumstances" standards). The circuit court
excused the waivers, finding both "plain error" and "special circumstances." Id. The special circumstances were that "at the time of Walker's trial, the law concerning the intent
element of assault with intent to murder was misunderstood by trial judges and lawyers,
and that the law was not finally clarified until . . . more than five years after Walker's
conviction became final." Id. The circuit court also found that Walker had a fundamental
ight to the proper instruction, which he had not personally, knowingly, and intelligently
waived. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reiterating that "the failure to
object to or otherwise challenge a jury instruction constitutes a waiver of the issue for

purposes of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act." Id. at 645, 684 A.2d at 437.
227. Id. at 647, 684 A.2d at 438 (referring to MD. R. 4-325(e), 8-131 (a)).
228. Id.
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waivers of [nonfundamental rights]."229 Although the Court of Appeals held that Walker could assert these exceptions to waiver on post-

conviction, it found that the principles were inapplicable to the
circumstances of his case. 23

°

In sum, the "plain error" exception to waiver is applicable in postconviction cases, as is the "special circumstances" exception. Al-

though the latter exception is not as well-developed as the former,2 3 '
the Court of Appeals has said that "special circumstances" may exist
when defense counsel fails to preserve error because of a "misconception by a large segment of the bench and the bar" about the governing law.23 2
In addition to the "plain error" and "special circumstances" exceptions to waiver, there are two other "exceptions," broadly conceived, to the waiver of claims based on both fundamental and
nonfundamental rights: (1) the PCPA provision that gives petitioners

the benefit of new constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court or a Maryland appellate court and applied retroac229. Id. at 648, 684 A.2d at 438.
230. Id. at 650, 684 A.2d at 439.
231. See, e.g., Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 237, 623 A.2d 632, 636 (1993) (holding
that it was plain error to fail to instruct jury that the prosecution was required to prove
specific intent); Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 135-36, 368 A.2d 1019, 1020-21 (1977) (holding that a change in law due to an intervening Supreme Court decision justified use of the
plain error doctrine to review a constitutionally deficient instruction); State v. Evans, 278
Md. 197, 211-12, 362 A.2d 629, 637-38 (1976) (same); Brooks v. State, 68 Md. App. 604,
613-14, 515 A.2d 225, 230-31 (1986) (finding plain error in a jury instruction allowing
reckless or wanton disregard to satisfy the mens rea requirement for conviction for malicious destruction of property).
232. Walker, 343 Md. at 648, 684 A.2d at 438. The Court of Appeals explained in Walker
that it had held in Franklin v. State, 319 Md. 116, 511 A.2d 1208 (1990), that the failure to
object to an erroneous jury instruction should be excused because of the "misconception
by a large segment of the bench and the bar concerning the intent element of assault with
intent to murder." Walker, 343 Md. at 648, 684 A.2d at 438. The Walker opinion noted that
the lower court had "held that this same misconception should excuse the failure to object
at Walker's trial." Id. It said: "We assume that, if the circumstances in the present case
were similar to those in Franklin, the circuit court's decision excusing Walker's waiver of
the jury instruction issue would have been warranted. The circumstances in the two cases,
however, were not at all comparable." Id. at 648-49, 684 A.2d at 438; see also Parker v. State,
4 Md. App. 62, 67, 241 A.2d 185, 188 (1968) (holding that waiver should be excused because appellant's failure to object to an erroneous instruction was neither "a bad guess
[n]or a trial tactic but resulted rather from a misunderstanding of the applicable law-a
misunderstanding also shared by the court, and by the State"). But see Hunt v. State, 345
Md. 122, 151-52, 691 A.2d 1255, 1269 (1997) (finding that there had been no change in
law that excused the failure of counsel to preserve a legal argument); Oken v. State, 343
Md. 256, 272-73, 681 A.2d 30, 38 (1996) (noting that the law was clearly established at the
time that counsel failed to object to jury voir dire, and counsel deliberately failed to raise
the matter on appeal as a tactical matter).
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tively,2 "3 and (2) demonstration that counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance (which allows the petitioner then to assert the
underlying claim) .34

IV.

A.

IMPORTANT ISSUES UNDER THE

PCPA

Whether the PCPA Authorizes a Court to Order Discovery

There is uncertainty about whether, and the extent to which, a
court may authorize parties to conduct discovery in postconviction
cases. If one traces the current governing rule to its source, however,
it appears that at a minimum, a court has discretion to order limited
discovery, especially by deposition.
Maryland Rule 4-406 grants courts broad discretion in conducting evidentiary hearings and structuring the rules that govern
them. The rule states: "Evidence may be presented by affidavit, deposition, oral testimony, or in any other form as the court finds convenient and just. In the interest of justice, the court may decline to
require strict application of the rules in Title 5, except those relating
to the competency of witnesses. 23 5
The authorization to accept evidence "in any other form as the
court finds convenient and just" is a particularly broad grant of
discretion.

233. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-106(c) (2004).
234. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("[T he right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." (quoting McCann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970))), and on appeal, Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) ("A first
appeal as of fight.., is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant
does not have the effective assistance of an attorney."); Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 671,
399 A.2d 256, 260 (1979) ("Entitlement to assistance of counsel [on appeal] would be
hollow indeed unless the assistance were required to be effective."). In Maryland, postconviction petitioners have a statutory right to counsel, which includes effective assistance.
Section 7-108 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides that right, and section 4(b) (3) of
Article 27A of the Maryland Code incorporates that fight into the Maryland Public Defender Act. "[R]egardless of the source, the fight to counsel means the right to the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Flansburg, 345 Md. 694, 703, 694 A.2d 462, 467 (1997).
In Stovall v. State, the court said: "A defendant has a broader right to counsel under the
Maryland Public Defender Act than under the United States Constitution." 144 Md. App.
711, 721, 800 A.2d 31, 37 (2002). It cited McCarterv. State, 363 Md. 705, 713, 770 A.2d 195,
199 (2001), and Fansburg,345 Md. at 700, 694 A.2d at 465.
235. MD. R. 4-406(c). Title 5 contains rules of evidence.
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The initial version of the PCPA, as enacted in 1958, included the
236 That provision, in turn,
substance of the above-quoted provision.
23 7
came verbatim from section 7 of the UPCPA.
The qualified right to conduct discovery is implied from the parties' right to present evidence by "deposition" and "in any other form as
23 8
The parties must be able to
the court finds convenient and just."

create those forms of evidence in the first instance. Without at least
limited forms of discovery, the parties would not be able to do so.
It is a novel issue in Maryland whether 4-406(c) authorizes a court
to order limited discovery, but appellate courts in other states have
like Rule 4-406(c) authorize postconviction
found that provisions
2 39
so.
do
to
courts

It might be argued that Rule 4-406(c) only permits courts to admit
depositions, but not to order that depositions be taken, and similarly,
only to admit "other form [s]" of existing evidence, "as the court finds
convenient and just," but not to issue orders that allow the parties to
obtain and create these forms of evidence. Or, it might be contended
that the rule only allows parties to take depositions to perpetuate testimony. There are serious problems with these arguments, however.
First, neither Rule 4-406, nor the commentary to it, contains any
such limitations.

Moreover, the admit-but-not-take-deposition

argument would

2 40
It is the rare
render the "deposition" provision a virtual nullity.

24 1
criminal case in Maryland in which a party takes a deposition.

236. Section 645G of the original Act provided: "The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence, and may order the petitioner brought
before it for the hearing." Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, § 645G, 1958 Md. Laws 178, 181.
237. UNIF. PosT-CoNVcrION PROCEDURE Acr, llA U.L.A. 267, 268 (1995).
238. Mo. R. 4-406(c).
239. See Gollehon v. State, 986 P.2d 395 (Mont. 1999) (applying MONT.CODE ANN. § 4621-201(5), which authorizes admission of depositions in postconviction proceedings, and
noting both a prior court order requiring discovery and that the parties took discovery
depositions to comply with it); see also State v. Wright, 42 P.3d 753, 758 (Mont. 2001) (applying section 46-21-201(5) and reciting that the deposition had been taken and admitted
into evidence and holding that strict compliance with deposition rules of civil procedure is
not required in postconviction cases).
240. See State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 134, 669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (noting that the
court interprets statutes "so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory"); Stanley v. State, 157 Md. App. 363, 378, 851
A.2d 612, 620 (2004) (noting that courts "should construe the statute in a manner that
results in an interpretation reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
241. MD. R. 4-261 (b) authorizes a party in a criminal case to take a pretrial deposition
only if the parties agree to do so ("subject to the right of the witness to move for a protective order") or "the court, on motion of a party, .. . order[s] that the testimony of a witness
be taken by deposition if satisfied that the witness may be unable to attend a trial or hear-
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Therefore, unless the postconviction judge orders that a deposition be
taken, there will be no deposition to admit into evidence at the postconviction proceeding. This argument also ignores the nature of the
postconviction process, which protects rights of convicted defendants
based on evidence outside of the trial and appellate record, not within
it, as a preexisting deposition would be.
Both arguments also ignore the central purpose of Rule 4-406(c),
which is to allow the parties to efficiently and effectively prepare,as well
as present, evidence and to allow the court to efficiently control the
hearings that it holds.
Finally, the history of the rule supports the limited-discovery interpretation of it. The Court of Appeals adopted Rule 4 -406(c) in
1984, thereby transferring the "deposition" provision from one Maryland Rule, Rule BK 44(d), to another, 4-406(c). Before the transfer,
Rule 1000 made the civil discovery rules applicable to Chapter 1100
proceedings, including postconviction proceedings. The Court of Appeals in State v. Giles242 explained:
With respect to the authority of the appellees [postconviction petitioners] to take depositions in a proceeding of this
nature, the lower court found that proceedings under the
P.C.P.A. are civil in nature and that the rules relating to civil
proceedings are applicable to them. The rules governing
post conviction procedure are to be found in Rules BK40
through BK48 in Chapter 1100 titled "Special Proceedings"
and not under Chapter 700 dealing with procedure in
"Criminal Causes." And Rule 1000 titled "Special Proceedings-General Rules Applicable" provides that "the preceding
Rules, Chapters 1, 100 to 600 inclusive and 800 are applicable to Special Proceedings dealt with in Chapter 1100, except insofar as the Rules contained in Chapter 1100
otherwise provide expressly or by necessary implication." Regardless therefore of whether the rules governing post conviction proceedings are civil in nature, there seems to be
little doubt, since Rule 1000, providing that Chapter 400
(Depositions and Discovery) is applicable to Chapter 1100
(Special Proceedings), that the authorization to take deposiing, that the testimony may be material, and that the taking of the deposition is necessary
to prevent a failure of justice." MD. R. 4-261(b). If the Maryland Court of Appeals had
meant to limit the depositions admissible in postconviction proceedings to those taken in
pretrial criminal proceedings, it most likely would have added a cross-reference to Maryland Rule 4-261 in Rule 4-406 or the commentary to it, or said something about this alleged intent. It did neither.
242. 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965).
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tions in post conviction proceedings was proper, and we so
hold.243
In State v. Bundy,2 4 1 the Court of Special Appeals reiterated the
then-accepted rule that "a post conviction proceeding is deemed to be
civil in nature," and therefore "the rules relating to civil proceedings
245
are applicable to post conviction proceedings."
Shortly after Bundy was decided, an assistant attorney general proposed to the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure that the evidentiary provision be transferred to the
criminal rules. When asked why the "post conviction procedure rules
are being placed in the criminal title, rather than in the civil title," he
offered a "housekeeping" response: "The Post Conviction Act is part
of the criminal article of the Code and the applicable procedure was
part of the criminal article [referring to the PCPA] until the BK Rules
were adopted, at which time the procedure was deleted from the
47
code."24' 6 A Committee member, Paul Niemeyer,2 asked whether
"the civil discovery rules apply" to postconviction proceedings (one
option), or whether "a deposition is permitted only by leave of court"
(a second option) .248 He then recommended language that would
249 The Rules Comhave precluded the first, but only the first, option.
250 This is not surprising
mittee, however, rejected that proposal.
given that several members of the Committee, as well as the Reporter,
either thought postconviction proceedings were, and should remain,
civil proceedings; or were not sure whether they were civil or
criminal.

2 51

Although one could argue from this history that the transfer of
the provision from the civil to the criminal rules means that the rules
of civil discovery do not generally apply to postconviction proceedings,
243. Id. at 467-68, 212 A.2d at 107.
244. 52 Md. App. 456, 450 A.2d 495 (1982).
245. Id. at 459 n.2, 450 A.2d at 497 n.2 (citing Gies,239 Md. at 467-68, 212 A.2d at 107);
see also Carder v. Warden, 3 Md. App. 309, 239 A.2d 143 (1968) (holding that a postconviction judge acted within his authority in limiting scope of relief to appellate review of petitioner's criminal conviction).
246. Minutes of Meeting, Maryland Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 90 (Oct. 15-16, 1982) [hereinafter Rules Committee Hearing
Notes].
247. Now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
248. Rules Committee Hearing Notes, supra note 246, at 90.
249. He suggested amending the second sentence of Maryland Rule 1-101 to read: "Title2," which includes the civil rules of discovery, "applies to civil matters in the circuit
courts, except postconviction procedures." Id. at 91.
250. See MD. R. 1-101 (b) (providing for the application of Title 2 to civil matters in the
circuit courts).
251. See Rules Committee Hearing Notes, supra note 246, at 90-91.
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the Rules Committee's discussions and decisions, as well as the history,
text, and purpose of Rule 4 -406(c), support the conclusion that the
drafters intended, at a minimum, to vest postconviction courts with
discretion to order limited discovery if the circumstances warrant it.
B.

The Meaning of the "Interests ofJustice" Reopening Standard

When, in 1995, the General Assembly reduced from two to one
the number of postconviction petitions that a petitioner can file,2 52 it
also authorized courts to "reopen a postconviction proceeding that
was previously concluded if the court determines that the action is in
the interests of justice."2

5

'

Although the General Assembly did not

define "interests of justice," the Court of Special Appeals has read it
broadly, as the General Assembly intended. The Court has said that
[a] lthough the phrase "in the interests ofjustice," as used in
[the PCPA] has not been defined, we have considered its
meaning in the context of a motion for a new trial under
Maryland Rule 4-331, the granting of which is also within the
discretion of the circuit court .... [T] he grounds "for the
granting of a new trial... [are] virtually open-ended .... "254

Speaking of a motion for new trial, the court said: "In Isley v. State, we
commented that 'there are no limits on the substantive content of
252. Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 110, § 645A(a) (2), 1995 Md. Laws 1473, 1482 (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-103(a) (2004)).
253. Id (codified as amended at CRuM. PROC. § 7-104). In Gray v. State, the court compared a motion to reopen with an original proceeding:
[A] person is entitled, as a matter of right, to file one postconviction petition.
The reopening of a closed postconviction proceeding, however, is at the discretion of the circuit court.
Also, as a matter of right, a person filing a petition for postconviction relief is
entitled to a hearing and the assistance of counsel. A request that a postconviction proceeding be reopened does not entitle a person to either. Under the statute, the circuit court determines if a hearing and the assistance of counsel
"should be granted." Md. Rule 4 -406(a) provides that,
in the absence of a stipulation that the applicable facts and law justify the requested relief, the circuit court
may not reopen a proceeding or grant relief without a hearing, but a request to
reopen can be denied without a hearing.
158 Md. App. 635, 645, 857 A.2d 1176, 1181-82 (2004) (citations omitted).
254. Gray, 158 Md. App. at 646 n.3, 857 A.2d at 1182 n.3. The court said these grounds
"includ[e] the following: 'that the verdict was contrary to the evidence; newly discovered
evidence; accident and surprise; misconduct ofjurors or the officer having them in charge;
bias and disqualification ofjurors... ; misconduct or error of the judge; fraud or misconduct of the prosecution.'" Id. The court added: "We also explained that a new trial could
be granted if the evidence was legally insufficient or the verdict was 'so against the weight
of the evidence as to constitute a miscarriage ofjustice.'" Id. (quoting Love v. State, 95 Md.
App. 420, 427, 621 A.2d 910, 914 (1993)).
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what may be urged . . . as being "in the interest of justice."'
Whatever limits there should be on the scope of judicial discretion to
act in the interests of justice are to be found in "the statutory constraints of the [PCPA] and the type of claims to which it affords a
remedy. "256
This broad interpretation of the "interests of justice" standard is
wholly consistent with both the flexible common understanding of the
word 'Justice" and the legislative history of the clause. It was adopted
as an amendment to Senate Bill 340, which contained the one-petition-only provision. 257 The Office of Public Defender proposed the
"interests ofjustice" amendment in lieu of the original "miscarriage of
justice" standard,2 5 8 which the Office argued was "insurmountable
federal language," 25 9 and the amendment became known as the "Pub-

lic Defender Amendment." 26" The Governor's Commission on the
Death Penalty, which issued its report in November 1993, had recommended both the one-petition limitation and the "miscarriage of justice" reopening standard. 261' The Commission explained that
establishing a standard for reopening postconviction proceedings was
a "difficult issue." 26 2 It offered as examples of its "miscarriage" stan255. Id. (quoting Isley v. State, 129 Md. App. 611, 633, 743 A.2d 772, 784 (2000)).
256. Id.
257. The following was the text of the amendment and deleted language (with original
statutory language in regular text, deleted language in brackets, bill provisions in capital
letters, and the amendment in italicized, capital letters):
SECTION 1:
645A
(a) (1).
(2) (I) A person may [not file more than 2 petitions] FILE ONLY ONE PETITION, arising out of each trial, for relief under this subtitle.
(II) THE COURT MAY IN ITS DISCRETION REOPEN A POST CONVICTION PROCEEDING THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED IF THE COURT
DETERMINES THAT SUCH ACTION IS IN ThE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.
S.B. 340, 1995 Leg., 409th Sess. (Md. 1995).
258. Proposed Public Defender Amendments to S.B. 340, Amendment 1 (Feb. 28, 1995)
(available in the legislative reference file, S.B. 340).
259. Id (statement of George Lipman, now a judge in the District Court of Maryland,
Baltimore City).
260. See id.
261. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN MARYLAND: 1978-1993, at xxiii (1993). In its "Recommendation 17," captioned "Elimination of Second Postconviction Petition," the Commission said: "The legislature should
amend section 645A of Article 27 to eliminate the right of a defendant to file a second
postconviction petition. The amendment should also provide that the postconviction court
may reopen a proceeding only if a reopening is necessary to avoid a miscarriage ofjustice."
Id
262. Id. at 258.
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dard, which it took from Supreme Court decisions, "new law claims,
i.e., claims based on judicial decisions subsequent to the initial postconviction proceeding," and claims that "a constitutional violation has
caused the conviction of one innocent of a crime. 26 3
The rejection of the "miscarriage of justice" standard and its universally accepted meaning, and adoption of the "interests of justice"
standard expressed the General Assembly's clear intention that courts
would consider a variety of factors, in addition to persuasive claims of
innocence and newly announced legal rules, to determine whether to
reopen a prior postconviction proceeding.
C. Potential Applications of the "Interests ofJustice" Standard, in Tandem
with the "Special Circumstances"Exception to Waiver
1. Mandatory Reopenings.a. When Postconviction Counsel Provides Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel to the Petitioner.-The Court of Special Appeals has said:
"There is no entitlement to have a closed postconviction proceeding
reopened unless the petitioner asserts facts that, 'if proven to be true
at a subsequent hearing[] establish that postconviction relief would
have been granted but for the ineffective assistance of. . . postconviction counsel.' ",264 Put affirmatively, there is an entitlement to reopen
if a petitioner can prove both prongs of the ineffective assistance of
counsel test.
First, the petitioner must prove "that [postconviction] counsel's
performance was deficient. ' 26 5 To do this, the petitioner "must (1)
demonstrate that counsel's acts or omissions, given the circumstances,
'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering pre263. Id at 258-59. As the Commission indicated, prior to 1995, the federal judiciary had
given the "miscarriage of justice" standard a restrictive interpretation in habeas corpus
cases, limiting it to claims of innocence. See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991)
(applying a "miscarriage ofjustice" standard that required an innocent man's conviction).
In fact, during the General Assembly's consideration of S.B. 340, the Supreme Court reiterated this principle in Schlup v. Delo, holding that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice"
occurs when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who
is actually innocent. 513 U.S. 298, 315-17 (1995) (discussing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 404 (1993)).
264. Harris v. State, 160 Md. App. 78, 97, 862 A.2d 516, 527 (2004) (emphasis added);
see Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 965 (arguing, prior to Stovall, that the ineffectiveness of
postconviction counsel is a compelling ground to reopen a postconviction proceeding).
265. Gross v. State, 371 Md. 334, 349, 809 A.2d 627, 635 (2002) (quoting Oken v. State,
343 Md. 256, 283, 681 A.2d 30, 43 (1996)).
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vailing professional norms,' and (2) overcome the presumption that
trial strategy.' "266
the challenged conduct 'be considered sound
Second, the petitioner must show that that counsel's "deficient
'
performance prejudiced the defense." 267 This means, "putting aside
those few situations in which prejudice is presumed (actual or constructive denial of counsel and actual conflict of interest), the defendant must show that the particular and unreasonable errors of
2 68 This recounsel 'actually had an adverse effect on the defense.'"
quires more proof than that "the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceedings. . . " but less than "that counsel's

deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the
case." 269 The test is whether there is a "substantial possibility" that
27°
counsel's errors altered the outcome in the case.
If both these tests are satisfied, the court must reopen the prior
proceeding and grant appropriate relief.
b.

Retroactive Applications of New Standards.-Thereis at least

one other ground that entitles a petitioner to reopen. It is, pursuant to

section 7-106(c) that a new, binding and retroactive standard in the
petitioner's case when it would "affect the validity of the petitioner's
conviction or sentence."2 7 l By the express terms of the provision,
claims based on such new standards, "[niotwithstanding any other
provision of' the PCPA, "may not be considered to have been finally
litigated or waived."2 7 2 This is a legislatively prescribed, mandatory
reopening provision.
2. Discretionary Reopenings.-In this Section, I combine discussion of the "interests ofjustice" and "special circumstances" standards
because a petitioner must satisfy both to reopen. That is, the petitioner must demonstrate both that it is in the interests of justice to
reopen (i.e., there are good reasons why she did not assert the claim
in the original proceeding), and she has not waived the claim she
266. Id. (citation omitted); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984);
Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 578 A.2d 734 (1990).
267. Gross, 371 Md. at 349, 809 A.2d at 635 (quoting Oken, 343 Md. at 283, 681 A.2d at
43).
268. Bowers, 320 Md. at 425, 578 A.2d at 738 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
269. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
270. Id. at 427, 578 A.2d at 739. For applications of these tests, see, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 605 A.2d 103 (1992).
271. MD. CODE ANN., CIUM. PROC. § 7-106(c) (2004). This provision was part of the legislative package of revisions in 1965. See supra Part III.C.l.h (describing the components of
the 1965 amendments to the Act).
272. CRIM. PROC. § 7-106(c) (2).
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wishes to assert by failing to assert it before (i.e., there are "special
circumstances" for this omission).
Because the "interests ofjustice" and "special circumstances" standards are fact dependent, it is difficult to generalize about case
profiles that might satisfy them. Assuming proper facts, however,
there are two that should be good candidates.
a. A Showing of Innocence.-Maryland law contains two provisions that allow some prisoners to assert newly discovered evidence,
including of innocence, under limited circumstances.
Maryland Rule 4-331 (c) allows three groups of litigants to file motions for new trials based on "newly discovered evidence."27 3 To be
successful, a movant must first establish that the evidence is "in fact,
newly discovered evidence-evidence that could not have been discovered by due diligence in time to have presented it [earlier]," 2 74 and,
second, demonstrate "that the newly discovered evidence 'may well
have produced a different result, that is, there was a substantial or
significant possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have
27 5
been affected.'

Those who are eligible to file motions under Rule 4-331(c) are:
(1) any defendant who files a motion within one year after final judgment;2 76 (2) a death-sentenced prisoner who "at any time" files a motion containing new evidence that "if proven, would show that the
defendant is innocent of the capital crime . . .or of an aggravating

circumstance or other condition of eligibility for the death penalty"
that the decisionmaker "actually found" when it "impos [ed] the death
sentence"; 277 and (3) any defendant who "at any time" files a motion
"based on DNA identification testing or other generally accepted scientific techniques the results of which, if proven, would show that the
defendant is innocent of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted. "278
273. MD. R. 4 -331(c).
274. Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 626, 751 A.2d 473, 480 (2000) (quoting Yorke v.
State, 315 Md. 578, 588, 556 A.2d 230, 235 (1989)). The defendant must file the motion
for a new trial within ten days after a verdict. MD. R. 4-331 (a).
275. Jackson, 358 Md. at 626, 751 A.2d at 480 (quoting Yorke, 315 Md. at 588, 566 A.2d at
235).
276. MD. R. 4-331(c) (1). The date of finality is "the date the [trial] court imposed sentence or the date it received a mandate issued by the Court of Appeals or Special Appeals,
whichever is later." Id.
277. Id. 4 -331(c) (2).
278. Id. 4-331 (c) (3).
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279
provides a
The 2001 DNA Evidence-Postconviction Review Act
narrower remedy by which some prisoners can obtain DNA evidence
280 and assert a claim based on
of "wrongful conviction or sentencing"
28 ' It authorizes a person convicted of an enumerated
that evidence.
to
283
crime (murder, manslaughter, rape, and sexual offense crimes),282
evidence
identification
"file a petition for DNA testing of scientific
284 A court "shall order DNA testing" if a twothat the State possesses.
part test is satisfied: (1) there is a "reasonable probability" that the
or
requested testing "has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory
mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing, '28 5 and (2) the test requested "employs a method of testing
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. "286 If the
test results are "unfavorable to the petitioner," the Act directs the
2 8 7 If they are "favorable," the court shall
court to dismiss the petition.
either "open a postconviction proceeding" if the petitioner has not
288
prior proceeding.
before initiated one, or reopen the petitioner's
28 9 Nor
The Act does not give a petitioner the right to counsel.
does it specify when a petitioner may be granted, or is entitled to, a
hearing. Because this provision is new, there is not a substantial body

it. 29
of case law interpreting and applying

°

at MD.
279. Act of May 15, 2001, ch. 418, 2001 Md. Laws 2494 (codified as amended
CODE ANN., CIUM. PROC. § 8-201 (2004 Supp.)).

280. CuM. PRoc. § 8-201 (c) (1).
281. Id § 8-201(h) (2).
282. Id. § 8-201(b).
283. Id. (emphasis added).
for limited peri284. Id. The Act requires the State to preserve some types of evidence
(j).
(i),
8-201
§
ods of time. Id
285. Id. § 8-201(c)(1) (emphasis added).
286. Id § 8-201 (c)(2).
287. Id § 8-201(h)(1).
288. Id. § 8-201 (h)(2).
289. Trimble v.State, 157 Md.App. 73, 81, 849 A.2d 83, 87-88 (2004).
Bronson, 672
290. For applications of similar provisions in other states, see, e.g., State v.
and
provision,
DNA
Nebraska
comparable
a
(applying
2003)
N.W.2d 244, 250-51 (Neb.
the judgment
holding that "a court may properly grant a motion to vacate and set aside
or exculpate the
under [a Nebraska statute] when (1)the DNA testing results exonerate
resulted
person and (2) the results, when considered with the evidence of the case which
essential
an
establish
to
evidence
of
lack
complete
a
show
in the underlying judgment,
2004 WL
element of the crime charged"); Shuttle v. State, No. E2003-00131-CCA-R3-PC,
postconvica
in
refusal,
court's
lower
a
(reversing
2004)
App.
199826, at *5 (Tenn.Crim.
and finding
tion proceeding under the Tennessee DNA Analysis Act, to order DNA testing
been proshave
not
would
he
that
probability
"reasonable
a
that petitioner had established
See also Saffold v.
ecuted or convicted if exculpatory DNA evidence had been obtained").
Florida statute);
State, 850 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App.2003) (interpreting a comparable
Missouri
State v. Kinder, 122 S.W.3d 624, 632-33 (Mo.2003) (interpreting a comparable
to -416
18-1-411
§§
ANN.
STAT.
REv.
(CoLo.
Colorado
in
exist
statutes
statute). Similar
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There is a group of prisoners who fall outside the combined
scope of these two protections. That group includes those who, more
than a year after their convictions, are able to obtain and produce
compelling, nonscientific evidence that they are factually innocent.
There are two ways in which such a demonstration of innocence could
be relevant. It might constitute a freestanding, substantive claim,
based on the federal and state constitutions, which a prisoner could
assert on postconviction."9 ' Or, it might be a factor that a court uses
to excuse the waiver of another, separate substantive claim. Under
this theory, innocence is the "gateway ''292 to the other claim, through

which the court may consider and resolve that claim on the merits. 2 93

Although the standards of proof may differ, Maryland's courts
should adopt both the gateway and freestanding theories of innocence as Maryland law.
(1)

FreestandingInnocence.-In Herrerav. Collins,294 the Su-

preme Court considered a constitutional claim of freestanding innocence. 295 Although the Court initially appeared to reject the
argument, 2 6 it backtracked later in the opinion:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this
case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration
of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal
(West 2004)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4504 (2001)); the District of
Columbia
(D.C. CODE ANN. § 224133 (Supp. 2004)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 19-4902 (Michie
Supp.
2003)); Louisiana ([A. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1 (West Supp. 2005)); Maine
(ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138 (West 2003)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-1A-2
(Michie Cum. Supp. 2003)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8-35a-301 (Supp. 2002));
and
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170 (West Supp. 2005)).
291. See the excellent analysis of the constitutional support for this argument in
George
C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims
of Innocence, 64 U. PiTr. L. REv. 263 (2003).
292. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).
293. Id. The Court in Herrerasaid that, under this theory, "a claim of 'actual innocence'
is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas
petitioner
must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the
merits." Id.
294. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
295. Herrera grounded his claim in the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
cruel and
unusual punishments and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.
Id. at
396-97. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, identified the different
conceptions of due process that the majority and dissent had. Id. at 407 n.6. For the majority,
the
issue was one of procedural due process-"whether [due process] entitles petitioner
to
judicial review of his 'actual innocence' claim." Id. For the dissent, it was one
of substantive due process-"whether due process prohibits the execution of an innocent
person."
Id.
296. Id. at 404-05.
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habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that
entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the
need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden
that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence
such29an
would place on the States, the threshold showing forhigh.
7
extraordinarily
be
necessarily
would
right
assumed
Courts and commentators have analyzed the various opinions in
Herrerain an effort to "count the votes" for and against the freestand298 It is clear that, assuming there is such a
ing innocence argument.

right, the Justices disagreed about the appropriate standard of proof
99
to establish innocence.
State courts have greater reason than do federal courts to recognize the constitutional basis of freestanding claims of innocence, as
several have recognized.
said that "the
297. Id. at 417. Justice O'Connor, joined byJustice Kennedy, concurring,
intolerable
execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally
J.,
(O'Connor,
419
at
Id.
innocent.
not
was
event," but she concluded that Herrera
concurring).
of the
In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (Cal. 1993) ("A majority of the justices
298. See, e.g.,
Fourteenth
and
Eighth
the
that
belief
a
expressed
have
United States Supreme Court
opinions of
Amendments preclude execution of an innocent person," citing the Herrera
Blackmun,
Justice
of
and
White;
Justice
of
Kennedy;
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
of Appeals, 885
joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Souter); State ex rel. Holmes v. Court
we understand six
S.W.2d 389, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ("From our reading of Herrera,
innocent person
members of the Supreme Court to have recognized the execution of an
United States
the
to
Amendment
Fourteenth
the
of
Clause
Process
would violate the Due
we cannot
Constitution .... With this sound and fundamental principle ofjurisprudence
or fundaconstitutional
a
of
violation
a
constitute
surely
would
execution
disagree; such an
1996) (stating
mental right."). But see People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 (Ill.
cases,
the Herreraopinions are "conflicted," but "[c]onflicted or not, at least for noncapital
cognizable as a
Herrera clearly states . .. that a freestanding claim of innocence is not
at 285:
fourteenth amendment due process claim."); Thomas III et al., supra note 291,
of
Though some have treated the constitutional status of a free-standing claim
Court
The
far.
that
go
not
did
Herrera
think
innocence as settled by Herrera, we
the sake of
reached, and rejected, Herrera's claim on the merits by assuming "for
of actual
demonstration
persuasive
truly
"a
that
argument in deciding this case"
and
innocence ... would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional,
a
such
process
to
open
avenue
state
no
were
there
warrant federal habeas relief if
claim."
the right of the
Id (footnotes omitted). The Washington court, however, went on to find
state due prothe
by
protected
was
innocence
freestanding
assert
collateral petitioner to
cess clause. 665 N.E.2d at 1337.
demonstration"
299. Chief justice Rehnquist would have required a "truly persuasive
"no rational
that
White,
417;Justice
at
U.S.
506
Herrera,
process),
state
the
of
(and a failure
(White, J.,
trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt," id, at 429
is innocent," id.
probably
"he
show
petitioner
the
that
Blackmun,
Justice
and
concurring);
at 442 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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In State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper,"°° the Missouri Supreme Court recognized a freestanding claim of innocence in a successive proceeding.3"' In a 4-3 decision, the court held that the Herreradecision itself
envisioned a more vigorous role for state courts in cases involving innocence claims. 3 0 2 Indeed, in the view of ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
the

federal courts have no role to play unless there is no "state avenue
open to process such a claim."3 0 3 The Missouri Supreme Court
held

that state habeas corpus was an "avenue" by which a capital petitioner
could assert a "compelling case of actual innocence independent of
any constitutional violation at trial."3 0 4 In determining the required
standard of proof of innocence, the court said it was not "required to
impose as high a standard as would a federal court in reviewing a freestanding claim of actual innocence, for ...this Court is not affected
by the federalism concerns that limit the federal courts' jurisdiction to
consider non-constitutional claims of actual innocence. 3 0 5 The court
concluded that the standard should be "a clear and convincing showing of actual innocence that undermines confidence in the correct06
ness of the judgment. 3
300. 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003).
301. Amrine was convicted of killing a fellow prisoner and sentenced
to death. Id. at
544. Throughout and after the trial, he claimed that he was innocent.
He eventually supported his innocence claim in state postconviction and federal habeas
corpus proceedings
with affidavits of all three prisoners who had testified against him
in which they each recanted their testimony. Id at 544-45; see Laura Denvir Stith, Symposium
on Tomorrow's Issues
in State ConstitutionalLaw: A Contrastof State and Federal CourtAuthority
to GrantHabeas Relief,
38 VAL. U. L. REv. 421, 424 (2004) (stating that when he lost in
these proceedings, "Mr.
Amrine made a final bid for habeas corpus relief directly in the
Supreme Court of Missouri .... [Hie was actually innocent of the crime, he argued. This
should at least provide
a 'gateway' for consideration of his underlying constitutional claims
under Schlup v. Delo.
And, he argued, even if he could demonstrate no underlying constitutional
violation, his
freestanding claim of actual innocence, considered alone, should be
enough to entitle him
to release or a new trial where, as here, all of the inculpatory evidence
from his trial had
been discredited." (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)).
302. See Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 546-47 (noting that the jurisdictional
problems inherent
in a federal court review of a state court conviction and sentence
do not similarly "deprive
a state court from reviewing the conviction and sentence if its
own state habeas law so
permitted").
303. Herrera,506 U.S. at 417.
304. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547.
305. Id. at 548.
306. ld. The court found that Amrine's proof satisfied this standard
and stated that "the
evidence supporting the conviction must be assessed in light of
all of the evidence now
available." Id. The court emphasized that "the evidence [at trial]
was not overwhelming.
There was significant evidence indicating Amrine's innocence from
the beginning ....
There was no physical evidence linking Amrine to the murder...
[and the three witnesses
against him] have now completely recanted their trial testimony."
Id. The court reversed
Amine's conviction and ordered that the State either file new charges
or release him. Id.
at 549. "The State initially did file such charges, but a few months
later dropped them and
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The source of the right in Amrine was the Missouri death penalty
statute, which contains a provision authorizing the Missouri Supreme
3 °7
Court to consider the "strength of the evidence" in a capital case.
The court added in dicta that the Missouri Constitution contains a
due process clause, and that, "as the purpose of the criminal justice
system is to convict the guilty and free the innocent, it is completely
and eventually execute an individarbitrary to continue to incarcerate
30 8
ual who is actually innocent."

°9
In People v. Washington, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
a noncapitalpetitioner's freestanding claim of innocence, which he asserted in a successive postconviction proceeding, and held that the
due process clause of the Illinois Constitution entitled the petitioner
to assert the claim.310 The court went beyond its reading of Herrera,
noting "we labor under no self-imposed constraint to follow federal
precedent in 'lockstep' in defining Illinois' due process protection." 31 1 The court held that "when newly discovered evidence indicates that a convicted person is actually innocent," both "procedural
312

a court provide relief.
and substantive due process" require that

he had once been
released Mr. Amrine-nearly eighteen years after the murder of which
433.
at
301,
note
convicted." Stith, supra
1998)).
307. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547 (citing State v. Cheney, 967 S.W.2d 47 (Mo.
Article I,
restraints,
constitutional
federal
absent
even
308. Id at 547 n.3 (noting that
section 10 of the Missouri Constitution prohibits such a due process violation).
309. 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
310. Id. at 1337.
311. Id. at 1335 (citation omitted).
believe that to
312. Id. at 1336. The court said: "In terms of procedural due process, we
the innocent
of
Imprisonment
.
.
.
unfair
fundamentally
be
ignore such a claim would
due process."
would also be so conscience shocking as to trigger operation of substantive
convicted
Id. The court challenged the rigid "legal construct" that a person who has been
the counterin a constitutionally adequate trial must be considered guilty regardless of
it is that a
vailing evidence. Id. "The stronger the [innocence] claim-the more likely
that the
convicted person is actually innocent-the weaker is the legal construct dictating
of
demonstration
persuasive
'truly
"[a]
that
follows
It
Id.
guilty."
as
person be viewed
the court said:
innocence' would effectively reduce the idea to legal fiction." Id. In sum,
or liberty given
"We believe that no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of life
is "new,
compelling evidence of actual innocence." Id. The test is whether the evidence
would
as
character'
conclusive
such
'of
importantly,
most
and,
material, noncumulative
'probably change the result on retrial.'" Id. at 1337. Other state courts have recognized
of Corr., 700
freestanding innocence as a collateral claim as well. See Miller v. Comm'r
is actually
he
that
establish
must
A.2d 1108 (Conn. 1997) (explaining that a petitioner
1356,
A.2d
641
Warden,
v.
Summerville
trial);
fair
a
received
he
though
innocent even
is cognizable by
1369 (Conn. 1994) (holding that "a substantial claim of actual innocence
the petitioner
way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even in the absence of proof by
trial"); Ex
of an antecedent constitutional violation that affected the result of his criminal
innoactual
of
claims
that
(holding
1996)
App.
Crim.
(Tex.
202
S.W.2d
947
parteElizondo,
Byrd,
v.
State
see
But
proceedings).
cence are recognized in postconviction habeas corpus
have
courts
appellate
Ohio
that
(explaining
2001)
App.
Ct.
(Ohio
1053
1043,
N.E.2d
762
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Distinguishing its prior decisions, the court said that although it
had in the past "perfunctorily evaluated new evidence claims in cases
brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act," it had never "expressly identified the constitutional right implicated in a freestanding
claim of innocence based upon new evidence."31

Judge Laura Denvir Stith, who sits on the Supreme Court of Missouri, describes the significance of decisions like these:
These cases recognize that the authority of state courts to
recognize freestanding claims of actual innocence is not derivative of the recognition of such claims in federal courts.
Federal courts must be concerned with issues of comity and
deference to state courts and state policies ....

[B] eginning

with Wainwright v. Sykes, the United States Supreme Court
has narrowed the basis of federal habeas review and made
federalism an increasingly dominant factor in its decision
making. In Herreraand Schlup, it made clear that, in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, it would hold
that principles of comity and deference preclude a federal
court from interfering with the judgment in a constitutionally adequate trial.
But, state courts can and, as is evident, often do provide
a remedy for such injustices under their state law, pursuant
to their authority under their state constitutions to grant
writs of habeas corpus in cases of actual innocence. 4
Maryland's courts could find that a noncapital collateral petitioner has a constitutional right to assert a freestanding innocence
claim, under either the federal constitution, 15 or under Maryland's
Declaration of Rights, especially the "Law of the land" provision in
held freestanding innocence claims alone do not provide substantive grounds for postconviction relief and should instead be raised as part of a motion for a new trial).
313. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1335.
314. Stith, supra note 301, at 436-37. Judge Stith also quoted Arleen Anderson:
The states must recognize that since Herrera, they shoulder most of the responsibility for providing review of post-conviction claims of actual innocence, especially
in non-capital cases. This is particularly true since the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which, for example, denies
a federal habeas court jurisdiction in a capital case if the petitioner fails to raise
his claim in state court, even if the claim depends on an assertion of actual
innocence.
Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. Rv. 489, 498 (1998).
315. See Thomas III et al., supra note 291, at 264 (arguing that the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require courts to hear freestanding innocence
claims).
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Article 24." l 6 In either event, the17claim would be actionable under
section 7-102(a) (1) of the PCPA.1
Although the freestanding innocence argument is strongest when
the petitioner is under a sentence of death, it logically also applies to
of the
prisoners who are serving noncapital sentences. "Imprisonment
18
well.'
as
intolerable
and
innocent" is "conscience shocking"
If a petitioner can satisfy the demanding burden of proving freestanding innocence-although the issue has not been uniformly resolved, several state decisions support a standard requiring clear and
9
convincing evidence of innocence"1 -the exceptions to waiver, espe2 ° ought to be liberally apcially the "special circumstances" provision,
3
plied, as should the "interests of justice" reopening provision.

21

It

would make little sense to recognize the principle, and then hold that
a demonstrably innocent person must remain in prison, perhaps for
life, because he failed to establish his innocence with due diligence.
(2) Gateway Innocence.-There is a counterintuitive quality
to the Supreme Court's clear recognition of gateway, but not freestanding, innocence. Under the gateway doctrine, "[f] reeing the innocent, a primary if not sole goal of the criminal justice system, plays the
role of a mere auxiliary doctrine whose only significance is to ease the
3'2 2
way for constitutional claims less weighty than itself."
316. MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 24 provides: "Due process. That no man ought to be taken
or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or,
in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or by the Law of the land." Maryland's courts have held that exculpatory
evidence "does not ordinarily provide grounds for postconviction relief." Gray v. State, 158
Md. App. 635, 647, 857 A.2d 1176, 1183 (2004). Rather, "[t]he usual approach for dealing
with newly discovered evidence is set forth in Md. Rule 4-331." Id. In this line of cases,
however, the courts have not considered and resolved the claims based on Herrera and
Schlup, or the constitutional arguments Professor Gordon G. Young and his co-authors
make in Thomas III et al., supra note 291.
317. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-102(a) (1)

(2004) (providing that a convicted per-

son may challenge his conviction if it was obtained in violation of the federal or state
constitution or state law).
318. People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336 (111. 1996).
319. See, e.g., Miller v. Comm'r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (Conn. 1997) (explaining that to establish a freestanding claim of innocence, the petitioner: (1) "must persuade
the habeas court by clear and convincing evidence.. . that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted," and (2) "must establish that, after considering all of that evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom, . . . no reasonable fact
finder would find the petitioner guilty"); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (a life-sentenced "petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence").
320. See supra Part III.C.1.h(2).
321. See supra Part I.B.
322. Thomas III et al., supra note 291, at 284.
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In Maryland, the gateway doctrine should be based on the text
and legislative history of the "interests of justice" and "special circumstances" provisions of the PCPA.3 23 In Herrera, the Supreme Court
said that a federal court's power to accept a gateway innocence claim,
and thereby to excuse a prior procedural default, "is grounded in the
'equitable discretion' of habeas courts to see that
federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons." 324 Maryland's courts are vested with similar equitable
discretion by the "interests of justice" and "special circumstances"
provisions.
Moreover, there is compelling evidence that the General Assembly intended to make gateway innocence, at least, a ground to reopen
a postconviction proceeding. Recall that the initial "reopening" standard that the General Assembly considered in 1995 was the "miscarriage of justice" standard. 2 5 It rejected that standard because it was
too restrictive.3 26 But, according to its proponent, the Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty, even that standard would have authorized a court to reopen a postconviction proceeding when a petitioner
demonstrated, as outlined by the Supreme Court that "a constitutional violation has caused the conviction of one innocent of a
crime."3 2 7 In adopting the more generous "interests of justice" standard, the General Assembly indicated its intention to include, at a
minimum, innocence as a ground to reopen.3 2
The Supreme Court formulated and applied the innocence-based
"miscarriage of justice" standard in Herrera3 29 and
Schlup. s ° In Her323. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-104, 7-106(b) (1) (ii) (2004).
324. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).
325. See supra notes 257-263 and accompanying text.
326. See Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 110, § 645(a) (2), 1995 Md. Laws 1473, 1482.
327. GovERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 261, at 258-59 (recommending the "miscarriage ofjustice" standard).
328. The legislative concern about the conviction and incarceration of the innocent
is
manifest in other ways. See, e.g., CRM. PROC. § 8-201 (authorizing a court under certain
circumstances to order DNA testing upon a "reasonable probability" that the test has "the
scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim
of
wrongful conviction or sentencing").
329. Herrera produced evidence of his innocence ten years after his trial and after he
had exhausted his state appellate and postconviction, and federal habeas, remedies. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393. He asserted his innocence in a successive habeas petition. In
rejecting Herrera's claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the limited role of a federal
court in reviewing a state trial court's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id
at
400. The refusal of federal courts to consider freestanding claims of innocence
"is
grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are
not
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact." Id. He concluded that "[f]ew rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide
for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence." Id. at 401.
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rera, the Court said a federal habeas petitioner "otherwise subject to
defenses of abusive or successive use of the writ may have his federal
constitutional claim considered on the merits if he makes a proper
showing of actual innocence. " "' If accepted, it allows the petitioner
to assert the "independent constitutional claim challenging his conviction or sentence."

332

Rather than asserting his innocence as a substantive constitutional claim, as Herrera had, Schlup asserted his innocence as a procedural matter, to excuse defaults of two independent constitutional
claims.3 3 The Court held that Schlup did not have to satisfy the demanding Herrera standard of proof of actual innocence. In Herrera,
the Court explained that "petitioner's claim was evaluated on the assumption that the trial that resulted in his conviction had been error
free. 3 34 In such cases, "it is appropriate to apply an 'extraordinarily
high' standard of review."33 5 In contrast, Schlup claimed that he was
denied a constitutionally fair trial. 33 "For that reason," held the
Court, "Schlup's conviction may not be entitled to the same degree of
respect as one, such as Herrera's, that is the product of an error-free
trial."

33 7

The standard of proof of actual innocence that is required to satisfy the "gateway" test is "evidence of innocence so strong that a court
cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is
also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error."33 8' The court equated this with probable innocence, which
means "it is more likely than not that 'no reasonable juror' would

have convicted him" in the light of the new evidence. 3 9
These same considerations support interpreting the "interests of
3 40 to recjustice" and "special circumstances" provisions of the PCPA
330. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
331. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
332. Id.
333. Schlup claimed that because his counsel was ineffective and the prosecution withheld evidence, he was denied a fair trial. Schiup, 513 U.S. at 313-14.
334. Id at 315.
335. Id. at 315-16.
336. Id at 316.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 329.
340. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-104, 7-106(b)(1)(ii) (2004). In Herrera, the
Court said that a federal court's power to accept a gateway innocence claim, and thereby
excuse a prior procedural default, "is grounded in the 'equitable discretion' of habeas
courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). Similarly, the "interests of
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ognize a gateway theory of innocence, and thereby to allow petitioners
who meet this test to reopen prior postconviction proceedings and
assert once-waived claims. 4 ' This is what the Circuit Court for Baltimore City did in the case of Michael Austin. 4 2
Michael Austin was convicted of murder in 1975 and sentenced
to life imprisonment.3 4 3 During the robbery of a food store, one of
two robbers shot and killed a security guard. A store employee and
four other eyewitnesses said the shooter was "a light skinned" African
American man, "5' 8" to 5' 10" tall, 150 to 160 pounds."3 4 4 Austin is 6'
5" tall and weighed 200 pounds at the time of the crime. Inexplicably,
the employee identified Austin as the shooter, both prior to trial
(from a photo array and in a line-up), and at trial.3 4 5 Austin was convicted based on the store employee's identification.
In fact, Austin was not involved in the robbery, but instead was at
work at the time, which his employer's work records confirmed. However, Austin's lawyer failed to subpoena the originals of these records
for trial. Austin obtained a copy, but it was a bad ("unintelligible")
copy that was excluded at trial. 46
During the years that followed, Austin, who maintained his innocence, unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on direct appeal,
through motions for a new trial, in three postconviction proceedings,
in a belated appeal (the relief in the second postconviction proceeding), and in appeals of the postconviction proceedings.3 4 7

justice" and "special circumstances" provisions grant broad equitable discretion to postcon-

viction courts.
341. Courts in other states have adopted the gateway innocence theory. See, e.g., Clay v.

Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo. 2000) (noting the applicable standard that actual innocence is "a gateway through which the habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claims considered"); State v. Pope, 80 P.3d 1232 (Mont. 2003) (explaining that the standard after Schiup was whether a reasonable juror would convict based

on the new evidence); Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(differentiating between Herrera-and Schlup-type cases).
342. Larry A. Nathans (chief counsel) and Booth Ripke represented Mr. Austin in this

proceeding.
343. Austin v. State, No. 17401280-82, slip op. at 2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 27, 2001). Austin
also received a consecutive fifteen-year sentence for a handgun violation and a concurrent
ten-year sentence for grand larceny. Id. at 2-3.

344. Id. at 11.
345. Id. at 33. This employee also identified from photographs the other alleged robber, but when he saw that defendant in person at that defendant's separate trial, the employee said he was not the robber, and the State dismissed the charges against him. Id. at

35.
346. Id. at 56.
347. Id. at 1.
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In 2001, Austin moved to reopen his postconviction proceedings
348 After a hearing, the Cirbased on new evidence of his innocence.
cuit Court for Baltimore City, Judge John Carroll Byrnes presiding,
found that the credibility of the State's sole eyewitness, the store em'34 9 by the
ployee, had been "severely compromised, if not destroyed
new evidence (which showed the employee was a drug abuser and
criminal, rather than an industrious college student, as depicted at
trial) .15 The evidence also established that a coworker in the store,
'351
who "stood within inches of the shooter, ' had said he was certain
3 5 2 and destroyed a damagthat Austin was absolutely not the shooter,
ing, alleged link between Austin and the alleged co-robber (the store
employee subsequently testified at the alleged co-robber's trial that
that defendant was not the co-robber, making the alleged link
irrelevant) .
The court decided to reopen the case. It construed the "interests
of justice" standard and gateway innocence exception in pari mateia.
It found that Austin's demonstration of innocence under the Schiup
test-"it is more likely than not that 'no reasonable juror' would have
convicted him" 35 4 given the new evidence-satisfied the "interests of
justice" test, removing the "finally decided" and "waiver" bars and allowing the court to reconsider issues that Austin previously had litigated or failed to raise. 355 The court found that the showing of
innocence was an independent ground for excusing waiver. It also
56
could have found that a "special circumstance" excused waiver.
The court reversed Austin's conviction on three grounds: (1) his
357 (2) the prosecutor made
trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective;
358 and (3) the jury
an improper and prejudicial closing argument;
had been improperly instructed that it was the judge of the law as well
as of the facts. 59 The court, however, rejected Austin's freestanding
innocence claim, finding that although Austin had satisfied the lower
348. Much of this evidence was developed by an "innocence project" called Centurion
Ministries; other evidence was obtained from police files after Austin's second postconviction proceeding. Id. at 31 n.41.
349. Id. at 57.
350. Id. at 48-49.
351. Id. at 58.
352. Id. at 56-57.
353. Id. at 49-51.
354. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995).
355. Austin, slip op. at 62-64, 78-80, 82-83.
356. See supra Part III.C.l.h(2).
357. Austin, slip op. at 86.
358. Id. at 77-82.
359. Id. at 59-64.
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gateway standard based on Schlup, he had not satisfied the higher free360
standing standard based on Herrera.
Following the decision, the State's Attorney's Office dismissed the
charges against Austin; Governor Robert Ehrlich gave Austin a "full
and unconditional pardon"; and the Maryland Board of Public Works
awarded him $1,405,000 for his over twenty-six years of wrongful
incarceration.3 6 1
This case demonstrates the critical importance of incorporating
the gateway innocence test into Maryland's postconviction law.
b. Reasonably Unforeseeable Developments in the Law.-To date,
Maryland's appellate courts have made little use of two exceptions to
waiver: (1) the "special circumstances" provision in section 7106(b)(1)(ii), 36 2 and (2) the "new standard" provision in section 7106(c).363 The use in the latter provision of the word "standard"
rather than "rule," and the history of that provision (part of a package
of reforms aimed at reducing procedural defaults),364 strongly suggest
that it should be used more frequently to forgive defaults like the one
360. Id. at 86-92; see also supra Part IV.C.2.a(1).
361. Release of Claims executed by Michael Austin on November 11, 2004 (on file with
author).
362. See supra Part III.C.l.h(2); Washington v. Warden, 243 Md. 316, 322, 220 A.2d 607,
610 (1966) (holding that petitioner's mental illness was a "special circumstance" that excused his failure to assert a claim in earlier postconviction proceedings). The "special
circumstances" provision may have been an inadvertent casualty of the Court of Appeals's
decision in Curtis v. State, when the court held that the provision applied directly only to
claims based on fundamental rights. 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978); see supra Part
III.C.l.h(1). This made the provision largely irrelevant since it is the rare case in which a
defendant who makes an express, on-the-record, informed waiver of a claim will be able to
demonstrate good reasons-i.e., "special circumstances"-that will excuse that waiver. In
recent years, however, Maryland's appellate courts have rediscovered the special circumstances provision, and applied it indirectly in postconviction cases to the waivers of
nonfundamental rights. The courts have done so by initially looking outside the PCPA to
"case law or any pertinent statutes or rules," but then finding that the PCPA
special circumstances provision is a "pertinent statute," and thereby returning to that provision indirectly.
Curtis, 284 Md. at 149-51, 395 A.2d at 468; see supra Part III.C.l.h(2).
363. See supra Part IV.C.I.b. There are a few decisions in which Maryland's appellate
courts have, or appear to have, applied this provision. See, e.g., State v. Dowdell, 73 Md.
App. 172, 533 A.2d 695 (1987) (applying retroactively in postconviction proceedings the
ineffective assistance of counsel standards announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)); DeLawder v. Warden, 23 Md. App. 435, 328 A.2d 76
(1974) (remanding the case to a hearing judge to determine whether, pursuant to the
PCPA new-standards provision and the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974), which held that the right of confrontation mandates that the defendant
be allowed to show possible bias of a prosecution witness by cross-examining the witness on
his probationary status as a juvenile delinquent, was applicable and if it should be retroactively applied).
364. See supra Part III.C.l.h.
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I am about to describe. I believe the following hypothetical, which is
based on a recurrent scenario, should satisfy the "new standard" provision. My focus in this discussion, however, is on the "special circumstances" exception.
In the case profile that I have in mind, there is an appellate decision that applies an established but broadly stated legal principle in a
new specific way that defense lawyers and lower courts reasonably
could not have anticipated. The appellate court, pointing to the legal
principle, concludes that its decision, or that of another court, does
not constitute a new standard within the meaning of section 7-106(c).
However, only a handful of prescient defense lawyers have protected
their clients by preserving the error in their cases. The majority of
lawyers acted competently. Their omissions were not tactical, or even
conscious. They, like the great majority of trial judges, simply did not

anticipate, and could not have reasonably anticipated, the decision.
If the new decision comes down after a prisoner has completed
the direct appellate process, and the prisoner did not raise the issue at
trial or on appeal, the prisoner would have to show special circumstances to raise the issue on postconviction. If the prisoner has completed the postconviction process, the prisoner would have to
3 6' 5 to reopen,
demonstrate both that it is "in the interests of justice"
and special circumstances exist to excuse the waiver. However, given
that the "special circumstances" test probably is the stricter of the two,
the central issue in my hypothetical case is the same: do special circumstances excuse waiver?
I believe they should under the circumstances I describe. The
"lottery" quality of our criminal justice system is most apparent in
these cases. Prisoners who had the handful of prescient lawyers get
new trials; the many more who did not remain incarcerated, some for
life. In many of these cases, the interests of the petitioner in a fair
trial and equal treatment should outweigh the efficiency and finality
interests of the state.
As noted earlier, Maryland's Court of Appeals has said that "special circumstances" may exist when defense counsel fails to preserve
error because of a "misconception by a large segment of the bench
3 66
In Reed v. Ross,3 67 the Suand the bar" about the governing law.
preme Court summarized the arguments for excusing waiver under
these circumstances. The Court said that "where a constitutional
365. MD. R. 4-406(c).
366. Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 648, 684 A.2d 429, 438 (1996); see supra Part III.C.1.h.
367. 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
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claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures.

'368

In these circumstances,

the "procedural failure is not attributable to an intentional decision
by counsel made in pursuit of his client's interests.3 6 9 It is not a product of "strategic motives of any sort."37 0 In addition, it is unlikely, either that the trial court, on its own, considered the argument or
would have accepted it if defense counsel had made it. The Supreme
Court explained:
Just as it is reasonable to assume that a competent lawyer will
fail to perceive the possibility of raising such a claim, it is also
reasonable to assume that a court will similarly fail to appreciate the claim. It is in the nature of our legal system that
legal concepts, including constitutional concepts, develop
slowly, finding partial acceptance in some courts while meeting rejection in others. Despite the fact that a constitutional
concept may ultimately enjoy general acceptance ....

when

the concept is in its embryonic stage, it will, by hypothesis, be
rejected by most courts.3 7 1
It follows that "requiring a defendant to raise a truly novel issue is
not likely to serve any functional purpose.

3

72

Indeed, such a require-

ment would be disruptive. "If novelty were never cause [for a procedural default], counsel on appeal would be obliged to raise and argue
every conceivable constitutional claim, no matter how far fetched, in
order to preserve a right for post-conviction relief upon some future,
unforeseen development in the law."3 7 3 Trial lawyers would have to

do the same. This would encourage trial and appellate lawyers to
make "meritless and frivolous" contentions, rather than those "legitimately regarded as debatable.

3 74

Therefore, basing waiver on counsel's failure to make reasonably
unforeseeable arguments "would not promote either the fairness or
the efficiency of the state criminal justice system. '375 Admittedly, ap-

plying Maryland's "special circumstances" exception in this way would
have a "finality interest" cost. But, the finality interest is not the only
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16 (quoting Reed v. Ross, 704 F.2d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Id. (quoting Reed, 704 F.2d at 708).
Id. at 15.
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one in these cases, and in these circumstances, the countervailing interests should outweigh it.
There should be limits, of course. The petitioner should be required to prove that counsel's failure to assert the error was inadvertent, not tactical, and was based on a shared misunderstanding about
the applicable law. It also might be appropriate to require that the
error the petitioner seeks to assert, based on the new interpretation,
satisfy a "prejudice" test that reflects serious concern about the reliability of the outcome of the petitioner's trial or sentencing proceeding. 7 6 Using, by analogy, the second prong of the Strickland test for
ineffective assistance of counsel, or the similar second prong of the
test for motions for a new trial, a petitioner would have to show there
was a "substantial possibility" that the error changed the outcome in
the case.3 7 7 Assuming such proof, Maryland's courts should recognize
these circumstances both as an exception to the waiver rule and an
application of the "interests of justice" reopening standard.
What follows is an example of circumstances that I believe should
qualify under the reasonably unforeseeable exception to waiver, based
on a "misconception by a large 7 segment of the bench and the bar"
about the governing legal rule.1 1
376. As part of my hypothetical, the new interpretation does not satisfy the "new standard" test of section 7-106(c). If it did, the petitioner would have to show only that the new
standard would "affect the validity of the petitioner's conviction or sentence."
377. Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 427, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990) (ineffective assistance
of counsel); Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 626, 751 A.2d 473, 480 (2000) (motion for new
trial).
378. Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 648, 684 A.2d 429, 438 (1996). The Walker court
explained why the court in Franklinv. State, 319 Md. 116, 120, 571 A.2d 1208, 1210 (1990),
had invoked the "plain error" rule on direct appeal to excuse a waiver. Franklin involved
an erroneous intent instruction that was delivered at a time when the trial court "did not
have the benefit" of the Court of Appeals's later clarification that a charge of assault with
intent to kill requires proof of a specific intent to kill (rather than proof of an intent to
inflict serious injury). Id. at 126, 571 A.2d at 1213. The Walker court explained that, because Franklin's defense was based on his intent, and the jury's instructions were not given
in accordance with the Court of Appeals's subsequent clarification of the intent requirement, the court could apply "plain error." Walker, 343 Md. at 649, 684 A.2d at 438; accord
Parker v. State, 4 Md. App. 62, 67, 241 A.2d 185, 188 (1968) (appellant's failure to object to
an erroneous instruction was neither "a bad guess [n]or a trial tactic but resulted rather
from a misunderstanding of the applicable law-a misunderstanding also shared by the
court, and by the State," therefore the waiver should be excused). But see Hunt v. State,
345 Md. 122, 691 A.2d 1255 (1997) (finding that there was no change in the law that
excused the failure of counsel to preserve a legal argument, and counsel for Hunt had an
opportunity to bring to the court's attention the decision allegedly recognizing the new
rule); Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 271, 681 A.2d 30, 37 (1996) (finding that the law was
clearly established at the time that counsel failed to object to the sufficiency of the jury voir
dire, and counsel deliberately failed to raise the matter on appeal as a tactical matter).
The case example that I use is based on an unreported opinion of the Maryland Court of
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For many years, most of Maryland's judges and lawyers believed
that courts were required to instruct juries in criminal cases that the
juries were judges of the law as well as of the facts, and that the court's
instructions on the law were merely advisory. The mandate to give
this instruction derived from a provision of the Maryland Constitution
stating: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges
of Law, as well as of fact." '79 This provision reflected Revolution-era
distrust of judges, especially those loyal to the Crown.3 '
In Stevenson v. State,3 8 ' the Court of Appeals held, for the first
time, that courts could not generally instruct juries that they were
judges of the law, despite the seemingly clear contrary requirement in
the state constitutional provision. To do so would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 8 2 There had been minor judicially imposed limits on the
advisory-law provision before, 8 3 but this was a dramatically different
interpretation of it. The court saved the state advisory-law provision
by judicially rewriting it. The court found that this provision did not
"facially deprive [ ] a defendant of the federally secured right to due
Special Appeals in Arey v. State, 153 Md. App. 716 (2003), cert. denied,380 Md. 231, 844 A.2d
427 (2004). I was co-counsel for Mr. Arey.
379. Md. Dec. of Rts. art. 23.
380. In Slansky v. State, the court said:
In England the question whether the jury should have the right to decide the law
in criminal cases was for centuries the subject of controversy. But at the time of
American independence the prevailing rule of the common law in England was
that the court should judge the law, and the jury should apply the law to the facts.
This doctrine was condemned by some of the Colonial statesmen, notably John
Adams, who believed that the juries should be entitled to disregard the arbitrary
and unjust rulings of the judges holding office by authority of the Crown.
' The colonists had had experience of the close connection of criminal law
with politics.... [T] heir constant fear of political oppression through the criminal law led them and the generation following... to give excessive power to juries
and to limit or even cut off the power of the trial judge to control the trial and
hold the jury to its province.
192 Md. 94, 101-02, 63 A.2d 599, 601-02 (1949).
381. 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558 (1980).
382. As the court explained more fully a year later, due process incorporates "certain
bedrock" rights "which are indispensable to the integrity of every criminal trial," including
that "(1) The accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty by the State by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt," and that "The State has the burden to produce evidence of
each element of the crime establishing the defendant's guilt." Montgomery v. State, 292
Md. 84, 91, 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981).
383. In Stevenson, the court cited to past decisions in which it had held under the advisory-law provision thatjuries could not determine a court's jurisdiction or resolve questions
of admissibility of evidence and competency of witnesses, and that it did not have unlimited discretion to arbitrarily create new laws and disregard established ones. 289 Md. at
178-79, 423 A.2d at 564-65.
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process of law"3'84 because it did not authorize juries "to decide all
matters that may be correctly included under the generic label
'law."' 3 85 Instead, the court said, the jury's law-deciding right is limited "'to resolv[ing] conflicting interpretations of the law [of the
crime] and to decid[ing] whether th[at] law should be applied in dubious factual situations', and nothing more."38 6
Although the Court of Appeals denied that its Stevenson decision
established a new rule,3 87 it certainly established a new constitutionally
compelled interpretation of the advisory-law provision. The Court of
Special Appeals has emphasized this on several occasions. In Petric v.
State,388 for example, the court said: "Ere Stevenson, it was generally

thought by bench and bar alike that jurors in criminal cases were
judges of the law and fact."3 89 But, the court said, "Stevenson made
clear that such was not the situation, but that ajury's judicial role was
limited to the 'law of the crime.' Other legal issues were for the judge
to determine. 3 9" In Allnutt v. State,391 the court had previously noted
that "[u] ntil Stevenson ....it was generally believed by bench and bar
that a judge's comments as to the law in a criminal case were advisory
and not binding on the jury. "392 But, "Stevenson told us that a jury's
judicial role was limited to the 'law of the crime' and 'that all other
legal issues are for the judges alone to decide." 393 The court added:
"Confusion then arose as to what was meant by the term 'law of the
crime."'3 94 The answer, the court said, came "[o] ne year later [when]
the Court in Montgomery v. State sought to still the roiling waters by
explicating Stevenson."3 95 The "message of Montgomery," the court said,
"is that Article 23 . . . [is] 'limited to those instances when the jury is

the final arbiter of the law of the crime'; that is to say where there is a
dispute as to the state of the law."3 96

384. Id. at 169, 423 A.2d at 559.
385. Id. at 178, 423 A.2d at 564.
386. Id. at 179, 423 A.2d at 564 (quoting Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 581, 357 A.2d 360,
367 (1976)).
387. Id. at 189, 423 A.2d at 570.
388. 66 Md. App. 470, 504 A.2d 1168 (1986).
389. Id. at 478, 504 A.2d at 1172.
390. Id. (citations omitted).
391. 59 Md. App. 694, 478 A.2d 321 (1984).
392. Id. at 701, 478 A.2d at 324.
393. Id. at 702, 478 A.2d at 325.

394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. (quoting Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 89, 437 A.2d 654, 657 (1981)).
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In Jenkins v. Hutchinson,397 the Fourth Circuit held that the standard Maryland advisory-law instruction given before Stevenson denied
Jenkins his due process right to a mandatory "reasonable doubt" instruction.398 The question, the court said, is not a refined one about
the nuances of a proper reasonable doubt instruction. "The issue
here, in contrast, is whether the jury was effectively given any reasonable doubt instruction at all.' " 99 The unacceptable constitutional risk,
the court said, is that "the jury understood the advisory nature of the
instructions as permitting it to ignore the reasonable doubt instruction," therefore licensing it to "fashion any standard of proof that it
liked."4 o
The Fourth Circuit concluded that, at least, "there is a reasonable
likelihood" that the jury applied the challenged instruction in an unconstitutional manner.4" 1 The court acknowledged that the flawed instruction was required by state law, but found this "irrelevant to the
due process claim," as even if the instruction were "proper as a matter
of state law," it "violates the Due Process Clause of the federal Consti40 4
4 °3
tution."402 It cited In re Winship in support of its decision.

397. 221 F.3d 679 (4th Cir. 2000).
398. Id at 685.
399. Id. at 684.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 685.
402. Id. at 685 n.11. The injury flowing from the advisory-law instruction is "structural"
in an even greater sense than when the Supreme Court used that term in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). In Sullivan, a unanimous Court held that a defective reasonable
doubt instruction denied Sullivan his right to a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In holding that the harmless error doctrine was inapplicable to the
flawed instruction, the Sullivan Court ranked the right to a proper reasonable doubt instruction with the right to counsel, right to an unbiased judge, and right to self-representation. The Court said:
The inquiry.., is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so,
because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter
how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be-would violate the
jury-trial guarantee.
Id. at 279. Without a proper reasonable doubt instruction, "there has been no jury verdict
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 280. The Court said that this is
"structural" error, quoting from Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991), and that
the absence of a proper reasonable doubt instruction undermines the 'jury guarantee,
which is a "'basic protection' whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281 (quoting Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)).
403. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
404. Jenkins, 221 F.3d at 683. Based on In re Winship, the Fourth Circuit found that its
decision in Jenkins did not create a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 299 (1989). Assuming that is correct, which I believe it is, it does not mean that
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In 1970, in In re Winship, the Supreme Court held that (1) the
Constitution requires a state, in the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding, to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and
(2) in the process, recognized the constitutional basis of the reasonable doubt standard.4 °5 The decision was noteworthy because of the
first point, not the second. The reasonable doubt standard had been
part of Maryland's criminal law for years,4 "6 and it had coexisted with
the advisory-law provision of the state constitution for years. During
the nine years between In re Winship and Stevenson, neither the Rules
Committee, 40 7 nor Maryland's appellate courts, 40 8 nor its lower bench

or bar,40 9 contended that the general statement of constitutional principle in In re Winship threatened the continued viability of the advisory-law provision.
In sum, this is one example, I believe, of a set of circumstances
that should satisfy the "special circumstances" and "interests ofjustice"
standards for forgiving waiver and reopening a postconviction proceeding.4 10 Admittedly, this would have an impact on a number of
older convictions, especially of life-sentenced prisoners who had jury
trials. I do not underestimate the "finality" costs of my argument.
They are very substantial. However, it also might be possible, by examining the records on a case-by-case basis, to evaluate the extent to
the Maryland bench and bar should reasonably have anticipated Stevenson and Montgomery,
based on In re Winship. Put another way, whether the reasonable unforeseeability of a
subsequent decision should comprise a "special circumstance" excusing waiver under the
PCPA is a substantially different issue than whether a federal habeas decision would establish a "new rule" under Teague and the AEDPA.
405. 397 U.S. 358.
406. E.g., In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975); Lindsay v. State, 8 Md. 100,
258 A.2d 760 (1969); Jenkins v. State, 238 Md. 451, 209 A.2d 616 (1965).
407. In 1975, Maryland Rule 756(b) required a trial court to instruct the jury in every
case in which it gave instructions that "they are the judges of the law and that the court's
instructions are advisory only."
408. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 12 Md. App. 91, 277 A.2d 460 (1971), affd, 265 Md. 256,
288 A.2d 885 (applying the advisory-law provision).
409. There is no public contention that I can find, or unpublished contention of which
I am aware, suggesting that In re Winship had imperiled the validity of the advisory-law
provision.
410. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 564 N.W.2d 753 (Wis. 1997). In Howard, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied its "sufficient reason" exception to the waiver doctrine under the
Wisconsin version of the UPCPA to excuse the failure of Howard's lawyers to foresee a
subsequent interpretation of a state statute. Id. at 762. It considered and rejected the
State's argument that "Howard had available to him all of the statutes, legislative history,
and the rules of statutory construction" that the later party who was successful had available
to him. Id. The Howard court held that the subsequent interpretation of the statute was
not reasonably foreseeable, and said: "To hold otherwise would require criminal defendants and their counsel to raise every conceivable issue on appeal in order to preserve objections to rulings that may be affected by some subsequent holding in an unrelated case." Id.
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which the advisory-law instruction likely infected the rest of the instructions and the extent to which it likely did not do so. 4 11 This

might provide a principled basis for honoring both the fairness and
finality principles.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Maryland General Assembly and Maryland's appellate courts
have developed a coherent body of collateral remedies.
The PCPA is the primary remedy.4 12 It has a broad substantive
scope: a petitioner can challenge a conviction or sentence if it is
based, inter alia, on a violation of the federal or state constitutions or
of a law of the state.4 13 It guarantees first-time petitioners appointment of counsel (if they are indigent) and a hearing.4 14 I argue that
the PCPA also authorizes courts to order limited discovery, especially
by deposition, so that the parties can present evidence in forms that
the court believes are "convenient andjust."a15 In addition, the PCPA
has a flexible, fact-sensitive reopening provision ("in the interests of
justice") 416
State habeas corpus complements the PCPA remedy.4 1 7 It is an
important means to challenge state actions that a detainee cannot
reach through the PCPA. This includes actions that illegally extend a
period of otherwise valid incarceration (e.g., through errors in calculating sentences or earned "good conduct time"),418 illegally reimpose
incarceration (e.g., by wrongfully revoking a prisoner's release on
mandatory supervision or parole), or change the rules after a sentence has been imposed (e.g., by retroactively requiring the governor
to approve parole).
411. From my review of the advisory-law instructions in a number of cases, I believe it is
possible to identify: (1) cases in which the advisory-law instructions were categorical, pervasive (given repeatedly), and close in time to burden-of-proof, standard-of-proof, privilegenot-to-testify, and other core instructions (thereby, effectively nullifying those instructions); (2) cases in which there was a perfunctory advisory-law instruction, which the judge
effectively overrode with categorical and separate burden-of-proof, standard-of-proof, privilege-not-to-testify, and other core instructions; and (3) cases in between these two poles. A
court might find that the first category satisfies the prejudice test and the second does not,
while sorting out the third category on a case-by-case basis.
412. See supra Part III.C.
413. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-102 (2004).
414. Id. § 7-108.
415. MD. R. 4-406(c); see supra Part IV.A.
416. CRIM. PROC. § 7-104.
417. See supra Part III.A.
418. "Good conduct time" allows an inmate to deduct a certain amount of his sentence
by exhibiting good conduct. See Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (D. Md. 1962)
(describing generally how "good conduct" time is awarded).
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In addition, a prisoner can challenge the legality of his conviction
or sentence by habeas corpus, as he can through the PCPA, but there
are powerful disincentives to do so that preserve the central role of
the PCPA.4 19
A convicted defendant, by motion filed in the original criminal
case, can challenge an illegal sentence at any time.4 2 ° In noncapital
cases, a court can grant relief "ordinarily... only where there is some
illegality in the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been
imposed."4 21 However, Maryland's courts have construed this principle flexibly; e.g., to review a claim that a court erred in imposing a life
sentence that was authorized for the crime, but without realizing it
had discretion to suspend all or part of that sentence, and therefore
without exercising that discretion.4 2 2 In capital cases, the scope of the
motion is broader. A petitioner may assert constitutional errors that
"may have contributed to [a] death sentence, at least where the allegation of error is partly based upon a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of [the Maryland Court of Appeals] rendered after
the defendant's capital sentencing proceeding. "423
In recent years, Maryland has given some prisoners expanded opportunities to assert claims based on newly discovered evidence that
substantially demonstrates that they are innocent, including deathsentenced prisoners and other prisoners who can demonstrate this
through scientific, especially DNA, evidence.4 2 4
If, however, Justice Frankfurter was right that "[t] he history of
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure,"4'25 then the assessment of the PCPA is mixed. Its procedural
default provisions, as construed, fairly protect a narrow category of
claims based on "fundamental rights," while providing little protection to the remainder of claims. In the latter respect, attorneys inadvertently "waive" these claims for their unsuspecting clients when they
fail to preserve those claims at trial and on appeal. Their actions and
omissions often are negligent, but fall short of actionable ineffective
assistance of counsel, and sometimes are competent, but not pre426
scient. These comprise the vast majority of attorney errors.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278-79, 855 A.2d 219, 309 (2004).
State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 825 A.2d 452 (2003).
Evans, 382 Md. at 279, 855 A.2d at 309.
See supra Part IV.C.2.
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See supra Part III.C.l.h.
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I make several suggestions about how courts might respond to
these problems by more fully enforcing the current provisions of the
PCPA, including: (1) a provision that authorizes a court to excuse
waiver when a petitioner demonstrates "special circumstances" that
justify excuse; 427 and (2) a provision that authorizes a court to reopen
a postconviction proceeding when it is "in the interests of justice" to
do so. 4 2 8 I argue that these provisions authorize postconviction courts
to recognize "freestanding" and "gateway" claims of innocence, 429 as
appellate courts in other states have done, and to excuse an attorney's
failure to preserve a claim based on a subsequent and reasonably unforeseeable development in the law.43 °
I offer two case examples in support of my arguments. In the
Michael Austin case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City accepted
and applied the gateway theory of innocence to reopen prior postconviction proceedings and provide postconviction relief to the petitioner. I argue this decision was correct. 41 In a hypothetical-a
composite based on a number of actual cases-I argue that Maryland's courts should excuse the failures of Maryland's lawyers to object to the old instruction that juries were judges of the law as well as
of the facts. I explain why I think the "special circumstances" and
"interests of justice" provisions of the PCPA support this
conclusion.43 2
I make my arguments against the background of the retrenchment in federal habeas corpus. I believe, quoting Justice O'Connor,
that "the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses
of government power. ' 43

I believe that if there is "a healthy balance

of power between the States and the Federal Government," it "will
43 4
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.
The understanding that state courts can and should act as a
check on the federal courts, and that this role inheres in the federal
separation of powers doctrine, is part of "l[b] oth constitutional history
and theory."43

5

It was state courts, after all, not Chief Justice John

427. See supra Parts III.C.l.h, IV.C.2.
428. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.C.2.
429. See supra Part IV.C.2.a.
430. See supra Part IV.C.2.b.
431. See supra Part IV.C.2.a(2).
432. See supra Part IV.C.2.b.
433. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
434. Id.
435. A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. Rav. 873, 935 (1976); see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (commenting on, and encouraging the "emerging trend among high state
courts of relying upon state constitutional protections of individual liberties").
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43 6
Marshall, who first developed the doctrine of judicial review.

Before the Civil War, "antislavery lawyers adopted a forceful states'
rights stance" to challenge the fugitive slave laws.4 3 7 In short, consistently throughout our history, state courts have read their own constitutions to recognize and protect rights in ways that supplement and
occasionally depart from Supreme Court rulings,43 8 and that tradition
43 9

continues.

I believe there is no more important time than now, and no more
important area than the collateral process, in which our state courts
can play this vital role.

Howard, supra note 435, at 877-78.
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. Ruv. 1105, 111 (1977).
See generally Howard, supra note 435.
Robert Williams, Foreword: Symposium on Tomorrow's Issues in State ConstitutionalLaw,
38 VAL. U. L. REv. 317 (2004).
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